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From Newsletter #1 
Dear Colleague, 
This newsletter follows a three-day Conference to Examine Mathematics as a Humanistic Discipline in 
Claremont 1986 supported by the Exxon Education Foundation, and a special session at the AMS-MAA meet-
ing in San Antonio January 1987. A common response of the thirty-six mathematicians at the conference was, 
"I was startled to see so many who shared my feelings." 
Two related themes that emerged from the conference were 1) teaching mathematics humanistically, and 2) 
teaching humanistic mathematics. The first theme sought to place the student more centrally in the position 
of inquirer than is generally the case, while at the same time acknowledging the emotional climate of the 
activity of learning mathematics. What students could learn from each other and how they might come to 
better understand mathematics as a meaningful rather than arbitrary discipline were among the ideas of the 
first theme. 
The second theme focused less upon the nature of the teaching and learning environment and more upon the 
need to reconstruct the curriculum and the discipline of mathematics itself. The reconstruction would relate 
mathematical discoveries to personal courage, discovery to verification, mathematics to science, truth to util-
ity, and in general, mathematics to the culture within which it is embedded. 
Humanistic dimensions of mathematics discussed at the conference included: 
a) An appreciation of the role of intuition, not only in understanding, but in creating concepts that appear in 
their finished versions to be "merely technical." 
b) An appreciation for the human dimensions that motivate discovery: competition, cooperation, the urge for 
holistic pictures. 
c) An understanding of the value judgments implied in the growth of any discipline. Logic alone never com-
pletely accounts for what is investigated, how it is investigated, and why it is investigated. 
d) A need for new teaching/learning formats that will help discourage our students from a view of knowl-
edge as certain or to-be-received. 
e) The opportunity for students to think like mathematicians, including chances to work on tasks of low 
definition, generating new problems and participating in controversy over mathematical issues. 
f) Opportunities for faculty to do research on issues relating to teaching and be respected for that area of 
research. 
This newsletter, also supported by Exxon, is part of an effort to fulfill the hopes of the participants. Others 
who have heard about the conferences have enthusiastically joined the effort. The newsletter will help create 
a network of mathematicians and others who are interested in sharing their ideas and experiences related to 
the conference themes. The network will be a community of support extending over many campuses that 
will end the isolation that individuals may feel. There are lots of good ideas, lots of experimentation, and lots 
of frustration because of isolation and lack of support. In addition to informally sharing bibliographic refer-
ences, syllabi, accounts of successes and failures ... the network might formally support writing, team-
teaching, exchanges, conferences .. .. 
Alvin White 
August 3, 1987 
From the Editor
How can students be encouraged that educational progress is happening?  The usual encounter with
formal education is often painful and filled with tension.  If these latter elements are replaced by joy
and excitement students often need reassurance that learning is occurring.
It took me many years after I graduated from college to come to believe that I could make an original,
significant contribution to knowledge or to the state of the world—or to myself—that my task was not
to prepare for examinations and learn what others had done, but rather to respond creatively to my
environment.  The job of education is not only to transmit knowledge or culture, but to encourage
creative responses.
***
Rita Colwell, director of the National Science Foundation (U.S.A.) was interviewed by K.C. Cole of
the Los Angeles Times (March 8, 2001).  Dr. Colwell, a biologist, had good things to say about math-
ematics:
“Mathematics reduces complex problems to the fundamentals...You can express complicated situa-
tions in a way that’s clearly understood, and allows you to make predictions...”
But isn’t all the mathematics that you need...already out there?
“Not at all.  It will require new mathematical research.  Before mathematics concepts can be applied,
they must be invented.  This is not going to be achieved by simply linking together the computers
we’ve got.  We’re moving into entirely new approaches, computers for the future...
“But we haven’t talked about beauty.  Mathematics is so soul-satisfying.  There’s such enormous
beauty in mathematics, and scientists have almost been embarrassed by the fact that the work they do
is beautiful.”
But doesn’t the problem with mathematics start...in grade school?
“We know that the ‘valley of death’ is between fourth and eighth grade, for both math and science...
“We’ve been hoping, dreaming of a plan to start centers for the science of learning that would focus on
education in science and math with as much intensity as we now put into other areas of research in
science and engineering...
“Now look at education.  In 1900 we had books, teachers, classroom, blackboard, desks.  In 2000 we
have books, teachers, classrooms, blackboards, desks.  A lot has happened in understanding how
humans think, in the cognitive and behavioral sciences...Why hasn’t all this new knowledge infused
education the same as it has for transportation and medicine?
“...The United States Commission on National Security/21st century recently concluded...that a greater
threat to U.S. national security, more than any potential political war...would be the decline and loss of
vitality and strength in science and engineering research and education in the U.S.  And I agree.”
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It is an open secret among scientists that accurate pre-
dictions made on the basis of scientific laws are rare.
Only yesterday, in the dark age of Carnap and
Reichenbach, prediction was believed to be the fun-
damental feature of science. This unrealistic belief
went hand in hand with a preposterous confusion,
namely, the identification of all of science with phys-
ics. In that age of savage simplification, shining ex-
amples of prediction in science were the confirmations
of the special theory of relativity, the explanation of
the spectral lines of the hydrogen atom by quantum
mechanics, and sundry other pillars of progress
gleaned from the science of mechanics.
It took philosophers well over fifty years to carry out
a reality check on their philosophy of science and to
diagnose the normative disease that has plagued phi-
losophy in this century. A casual inspection of any
science other than physics or chemistry proves beyond
reasonable doubt that scientific prediction in the sense
of the positivists is at best a cruel joke. Zoology and
cosmology, economics and evolutionary biology are
only tangentially concerned with accurate prediction.
A description of the scientific enterprise pruned of
normative presuppositions lies still in the future.
Meanwhile, we may begin to chip away at the barri-
ers that stand in the way. One such barrier is the sys-
tematic misuse of language by philosophers and lo-
gicians. Common words are rudely deprived of the
multiple and contradictory meanings that they enjoy
in ordinary language; after the straitjacket of a fixed
meaning for every word is imposed, the door is shut
to realistic description.
We have chosen the word “is” as paradigmatic of the
constipation of meaning from which contemporary
philosophy is suffering. We describe some of the mul-
tiple senses of the question: “What is mathematics?”
when the question is asked in various circumstances.
What “Is” Mathematics?
In Memoriam of
Gian-Carlo Rota
Professor of Applied Mathematics and Philosophy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
E-mailed by Rota to friends October 7, 1998
The reigning orthodoxy of philosophy identifies the
uses of “is” with the restricted uses of the word “is”
in Fregean logic. Logic has achieved in this century a
state of perfection that few mathematical theories have
matched. However (or perhaps for this very reason),
logical reasoning has become totally divorced from
actual reasoning, the kind that is found in real life. In
most worldly circumstances, logic shines by its ab-
sence. A compelling logical argument is the last
weapon of the rhetorician, a recourse to be appealed
to in desperate situations, when all else has failed.
It is no accident that substantial applications of
Fregean logic are found daily in computer science. The
crazies of the eighties, who pretended to simulate the
mind with primitive computers, have succeeded, by
a display of illiterate reductionism, in clearing up the
abyss that separates human discourse from logical
deduction.
It is thus no surprise to realize that the meanings of
the word “is” prescribed by logicians are a lot closer
to the ranting of Ayerian philosophy-fiction than to
the richness of senses of the word “is” in everyday
writing and conversation.
The accusation of being “illogical” may be leveled at
us. Our retort will be a call to duty: realistic descrip-
tion is a paramount task of the philosopher. The first
step in a philosophical description consists in admit-
ting that the real is seldom rational and the rational is
seldom real. An “Abgrund” separates “Verstand”
from “Vernunft.” Philosophical description must
grapple with open-ended varieties of irreducible cases,
with contradictory and ambiguous conclusions which
Enlightenment Reason has ignored.
It is our contention that the word “is” in the question
“What is mathematics?” does not have a classifiable
set of meanings. This contention in no way implies
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that the word “is” is devoid of meaning. Quite the
contrary: we are confronted with an “embarras de
choix” among the meanings of “is.”
What follows is a partial list of contexts in which the
question “What is mathematics?” is found. The list is
deliberately biased; it is meant to lead up to a conclu-
sion decided upon in advance.
“IS” AS DICTIONARY DEFINITION
Literally, the question “What is mathematics?” calls
for a “definition” of mathematics.
We have been trained to restrict the meaning of the
word “definition” to the role of definition in axiom-
atic mathematical systems. This mathematical sense
of the word “definition” will be henceforth disre-
garded. The senses of the
word “definition” in ordi-
nary discourse bear little re-
lation to mathematical defi-
nition.
The word “definition” oc-
curs in a great many vague
and unclear senses, which it
would be presumptuous to list. The most common,
as well as the most ambiguous is the “definition” that
we expect to find when we look up a word in a dictio-
nary.
What is a dictionary definition? In what sense do dic-
tionaries “define” words?
An old skeptical argument purports to prove that dic-
tionary definition is impossible. It runs roughly as
follows. Suppose you look up the meaning of word
A. The dictionary explains the meaning of A in terms
of words B, C and D, say. It may happen that B, C and
D categorically specify A as the sole word satisfying
certain conditions. But this happens very seldom.
More frequently, the dictionary explanation of A in
terms of B, C and D is likely to be a vague approxima-
tion to the meaning of A. The reader is asked to “get a
feeling” for A by various tricks: the explanation of A
in terms of B, C and D may be the description of a
general class of which A is a member, or it may be a
list of likenesses, of comparisons with other objects
that are meant to be “like” A; one reads various indi-
rect hints to the meaning to A. What cannot be given
in a dictionary is “the meaning” of A.
This frustrating remark by no means implies that the
reader will miss the meaning of A when looking up
A. The reader is expected to grasp the meaning of A
by letting his imagination roam “beyond” the vari-
ous statements in the dictionary that are meant to
“lead up to” the meaning of A. The meaning of A can
be grasped only when one looks “away” from the dic-
tionary explanations “towards” some other sense that
is not given there, but which the dictionary explana-
tions “point to.” No amount of explanation can make
sure that the reader will take the leap that will dis-
close the meaning of A.
The skeptical argument mistakenly concludes that no
definition can be “given” in the dictionary, except in
the eyes of the beholder.
The preceding argument
stands in contrast with what
actually happens when
someone looks up a word in
the dictionary. In point of
fact, people do find the
meaning of words in the
dictionary. If we look up the word “jaguar,” we will
get an adequate idea of a jaguar, even if we have never
seen a jaguar or know nothing about jaguars. When I
look up the word “chair,” I get a pretty good idea of
what a chair is, even if I do not quite grasp the full
meaning of what I have “read” until I become famil-
iar with actual chairs.
Dictionaries of synonyms are a further confirmation
of the same phenomenon. One learns the meaning of
a new word from approximate explanations, by a pro-
cess that cannot be rationally accounted for. When we
look up the synonyms of a known word, we are
searching for some word that we may never have seen.
We approximately guess the meaning of the syn-
onyms, even though these meanings are nowhere
given, and we select an appropriate synonym which
we may never have previously seen or used.
The non-rational grasping of the meaning of a word
from approximate explanations is an instance of the
phenomenon of the “copula,” of the function of “is”
in “A is B.” What matters here is that the “is” acts as a
copula only for certain A’s and B’s, like “jaguar” and
❝The skeptical argument mistakenly concludes
that no definition can be “given” in the dictionary,
except in the eyes of the beholder.
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“chair.” Certain other words pose a different problem
of “is” that is not subsumed in the “copula” sense of
“is.” One such word is “mathematics.” Any “math-
ematics is...” sentence given in response to the ques-
tion “What is mathematics?” will be evasive. No sen-
sible dictionary definition of “mathematics” can be
given.
“IS” AS INVITATION
The situation is different when we look up the word
“mathematics” in an encyclopedia rather than in a
dictionary. In an encyclopedia we find summaries of
entire mathematical fields, as well as a bird’s eye view
of various branches of mathematics and an ample bib-
liography that will guide us to learning mathematics.
Is the description of “mathematics” in an encyclope-
dia an adequate answer to the question “What is math-
ematics?” unlike the dictionary? Clearly not. The ex-
planation of “mathematics” that we find in an ency-
clopedia skirts the question by referring us, after an
enticing preamble, to technical expositions and clas-
sical treatises.
Both the dictionary “is” and the encyclopedia “is” are
motivated by the widely felt need of explaining eso-
teric words in exoteric language. This need roughly
dates back to the Renaissance, when the first dictio-
naries (in the contemporary sense of the term) were
compiled. Throughout history, notably in the Middle
Ages, no need for exoteric expositions was felt. Ex-
planations (often labeled “definitions”) were an in-
ternal affair for specialists, from which the public was
excluded. The scholastic definition of “Deus” as “eng
perfect-issimum” was meant to be shared by philoso-
phers and theologians only. Uttering such a statement
in the course a Sunday sermon at Mass might have
led to an accusation of heresy.
The Renaissance-Enlightenment notion of definition
as exoteric explanation is motivated by the democratic
ideal of a universal culture. Such a laudable objective
does not make exoteric explanation any easier. Fortu-
nately, an exoteric explanation of mathematics is sel-
dom what the questioner expects when posing the
question “What is mathematics?”. Let us see.
“IS” AS COPOUT
The question “What is mathematics?” is often asked
when the questioner has little or no acquaintance with
mathematics, and wants to discharge his or her duty
to learn something about mathematics, hoping for a
short answer.
The question “What is mathematics?”, asked to a
mathematician by a person ignorant of mathematics,
makes mathematicians uneasy. The mathematician
senses dishonesty in the abruptness of the question.
The questioner believes that an answer can be given,
similar to the answers one can give to questions like
“What is boeuf bourguignon?”, “What is yellow fe-
ver?” or “What are Magli shoes?”.
The questioner does not want to learn any mathemat-
ics when he asks the question “What is mathemat-
ics?”. The opposite is true: the questioner wants to
rid himself of the need of learning any mathematics
whatsoever. He wants to add to his conversational rep-
ertoire some brilliant answer that will permanently
excuse him from any further dealings with the sub-
ject.
One cannot escape the duty of giving a nutshell an-
swer to the question “What is mathematics?”, despite
the dishonesty of all short answers. Non-mathemati-
cians need to have some idea of what mathematics
“is” without having to study mathematics. They are
dealing with mathematics as outsiders, but their deal-
ings will affect the future of mathematics: mathemat-
ics requirements for schools must be determined by
professional educators; mathematical proficiency
among employees in a firm has to be gauged. Worst
of all, the allocation of research funds for mathemat-
ics is made by individuals who have at best a fleeting
acquaintance with the subject. Mathematics, like all
intellectual disciplines, is not economically self-sus-
taining , and since the beginnings of civilization math-
ematicians have depended for their survival on the
largesse of society or of a few wealthy individuals.
Mathematicians, like philosophers and artists, are
“kept” persons. In return, the public expects math-
ematicians to make the results of their work acces-
sible to cultivated persons who may have a passing
interest in mathematics, or who deal with the politi-
cal and economic problems of mathematicians.
We will leave to another occasion the tragedy that has
resulted from the mathematicians’ failure, going all
the way back to Pythagoras, of giving exoteric ac-
counts of their field that the public could appreciate.
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An accessible and short answer to the question “What
is mathematics?” may be difficult to give, it may turn
out to be dishonest and inadequate, but the mathema-
ticians’ failure to provide such an answer has been a
costly mistake.
“IS” AS ESCAPE
Students confronted with the task of learning a math-
ematical theory rarely feel the need to ask the pre-
liminary question “What is mathematics?”. They are
more likely to ask specific questions, such as “What is
topology?”, “What is the
Riemann hypothesis?”,
“What is a random vari-
able?”.
Suppose nevertheless, by
way of thought experiment,
that a student of mathematics were to ask such a ques-
tion, on the basis of his claim that an answer to the
question is a condition to be met preliminary to his
getting down to serious study.
It is likely that a teacher hearing such a question from
a student would give the student a strange look. The
teacher would be put on guard: is the student unfa-
miliar with grade-school mathematics? is the student
afraid of learning mathematics? does the student be-
lieve that an authorization is to be granted before un-
dertaking the study of mathematics? is the student
afraid of mathematics? does this student require medi-
cal attention?
In each of these instances, the teacher will not hazard
an answer to the question. Most likely, the teacher may
whisper to the student a few soothing words, not in
the least meant to provide any explanation of what
mathematics is, but rather meant to allay the anxieties
that the student’s question betrays.
“IS” AS SUMMING UP
Some mathematicians who are reaching the end of
their careers (Poincaré, Hadamard, Weyl), feel the
need to answer the question “What is mathematics?”
as a prop to their fading hold on the subject, much as
they might feel the need to write an autobiography.
In these circumstances, the question “What is math-
ematics?” is an excuse for excursions into the history
and philosophy of mathematics. The essays written
in answer to this rhetorically posed question will deal
with the “nature,” the “structure,” the “standing” of
mathematics. The “is” is once more skirted by being
turned into an “about,” into discussions about the
mathematics of the time, about future directions of
mathematics, about relationships among various
fields of mathematics.
“IS” AS IMPOSSIBLITY
We have argued that no answer to the question “What
is mathematics?” can be given in the form “mathemat-
ics is...” by examining some contexts in which the
question is asked. In none
of the instances considered
can the question be given
an answer of the form
“mathematics is...” In the
first instance an answer of
the form “mathematics
is...” may be read in a dictionary, but such an answer
is not taken seriously.
Are we to infer that no answer to the question “What
is mathematics?” can ever be given?
Let us call a word X a “pre-ontological term” when-
ever no adequate answer to the question “What is X?”
can be given in the form “X is...“ The preceding ex-
amples suggest that “mathematics” is a pre-ontologi-
cal term.
Most words of common usage are not pre-ontologi-
cal terms. For instance the word “chair” is not a pre-
ontological term, since we can answer the question
“What is a chair?” by sentences of the form “a chair
is...” An adequate such set of sentences will provide a
description of chairs that is good enough for most
purposes, even though no set of sentences may suc-
ceed in “defining” the word “chair” in the logical
sense. We use the word “item” to denote any word X
for which an adequate (though not necessarily logi-
cal) answer can be given to the question “What is X?”
in the form “X is...” “Chair,” “triangle,” “jaguar” are
items. Our claim is that there are pre-ontological terms,
and pre-ontological terms are not items.
The philosophical literature is rich in pre-ontological
terms: “time,” “world” and “nothing” are three pre-
ontological terms that have been studied in the phe-
nomenological literature. The question “What is
time?” has been deemed unanswerable by philoso-
❝Are we to infer that no answer to the question
“What is mathematics?” can ever be given?
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #24 5
phers since St. Augustine. The question “What is
‘nothing’?” is obviously intractable. In Chapter 3 of
Sein und Zeit, Heidegger argues that “world” is a pre-
ontological term.
The limitations of the language by which we describe
and define items, a language made up of “A is B”-
type sentences, stand in the way of describing (let
alone defining) pre-ontological terms. One is forced
to choose between two alternatives: either to decide
that no sense can be made of sentences of the form “X
is...” whenever X is a pre-ontological term, or else to
find a sense of the word “is” that is distinct from the
“is” as copula in the language of items.
The first alternative was followed in phenomenology,
by an argument—the joint work of several authors—
that we will try to sketch.
What “common” features of the words “mathemat-
ics,” “time,” “nothing” and “world” lead us to clas-
sify these words under the heading of pre-ontologi-
cal terms?
The word “is” used as copula in “A is B” presupposes
a context of sense-making. A can only be B within a
background of unthematized features that are ordi-
narily passed over in silence. More formally: the “is”
of “A is B” presupposes a context within which the
“is” can “be.” For example, “chair” presupposes a
context of everydayness in which chairs are useful.
No item can “be” without some such background con-
text. “To be” is “to be-in-a-context.” We read, pro-
nounce, deal with the sentence “A is B” while pre-
tending that the meaning of the sentence is to be found
“in” the sentence itself, independently of any contex-
tual background. The canons of logic foster the pre-
tense of a decontextualized meaning of “A is B”; the
cliché sentences given as examples in logic textbooks
are carefully cleansed of contextual references. One
can hardly imagine any such sentences (“the snow is
white”) ever used in daily conversation. But when-
ever “A is B” is used meaningfully, i.e., contextually,
an unthematized background context can always be
brought to the fore.
The “is” in “A is B” purports to explain A in terms of
B. Such an explanation is made possible by a multi-
layered twine of contextual and intercontextual senses
that link A to B. Without such an underlying contex-
tual/intercontextual twine, no sense can be made of
“A is B.”
The “is” of “A is B” is meaningful if both A and B are
items, i.e., whenever both A and B are ensconced in a
common context. However, the statement “A is B”
becomes problematic when either A or B are pre-on-
tological terms. Pre-ontological terms are not items,
but conditions of possibility of the contextuality that
allows items to “be.” In plain words: no sentence of
the form “time is...” can make sense, because “time”
is not an entity of any kind, but a condition of possi-
bility of all entities.
However, the impossibility of making sense of any
“time is...” sentence does not deliver us from the prob-
lem of understanding the pre-ontological phenom-
enon of time. Rather, it points to the need for a lan-
guage other than the language of items that will be
suitable for the inquiry into the sense of time.
No “definition” of the term “mathematics” can de-
scribe that particular context that we call mathemat-
ics. Mathematics is not an item that certain contexts
share. Mathematics is the condition of possibility of
mathematical contexts. We cannot explain what math-
ematics “is” by sentences of the form “A is B,” where
A and B are items, because mathematics “is” no-thing.
The word “is” is misused when we try to explain what
mathematics “is” in the language of contextual items.
Questions like “What is mathematics?”, “What is
time?”, “What is the world?” are misleading. Math-
ematics, time and world are not items, and hence it
makes no sense to ask what they “are.”
“IS” AS A WONDER
Are we to conclude that the question “What is math-
ematics?” should be dismissed as meaningless? Such
a conclusion would be strikingly similar to the anath-
emas of the positivists, always ready to liquidate as
“meaningless” any question beyond the reach of their
narrow vocabularies. Besides, such a conclusion
would bring back the specter of normative philoso-
phy from which we have proudly distanced ourselves.
The question “What is mathematics?” is not always
asked by way of a copout, as in the examples above.
The question “What is mathematics?” is sometimes
posed, both by the student and by the mature math-
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ematician, to express a feeling of wonder, to signify
the estrangement that possesses us at times, the same
estrangement that is felt in the contemplation of the
starry sky and the moral law, described by Kant at
the beginning of his “Critique of practical reason.”
This feeling of estranged wonder is the opening to
philosophical inquiry, as Aristotle was first to note.
The question “What is mathematics?” may express the
feeling of the wonder at the contemplation of the
awesome edifice of mathematics.
The feeling of wonder that is sometimes expressed
by the question “What is mathematics?” is not likely
to be an “answer” to the question “What is mathemat-
ics?” It will be the start of a philosophical journey that
will eventually disclose of the “conditions of possi-
bility” of mathematics. The disclosure of such condi-
tions of possibility is the “answer” to the question.
Sadly, philosophers have neglected the task of giving
a rigorous formulation of the method of reasoning that
leads to the disclosure of conditions of possibility. If
the day ever comes when the “logic” of conditions of
possibility, i.e., philosophy, is developed with the stan-
dards of rigor that have been set by Fregean logic, then
an “answer” to the question “What is mathematics?”
will be possible in the form “mathematics is ...”
May be sung to the tune of the Eagles’ “Hotel California”
by Don Felder, Don Henley and Glen Frey.
On a dark desert highway—not much scenery
Except this long hotel stretchin’ far as I can see
Neon sign in front read “No Vacancy,”
But it was late and I was tired, So I went inside to
plea.
The clerk said, “No problem. Here’s what can be
done—
We’ll move guest in room N to the next higher one.
That will free up the first room and that’s where you
can stay.”
I tried understanding this as I heard him say:
Chorus:
“Welcome to the Hotel In...finity—
where every room is full (every room is full)
Yet there’s room for more.
Yeah, plenty of room at the Hotel In...finity—
Move ‘em down the floor (move em’ down the floor)
To make room for more.”
I’d just gotten settled, I’d finally unpacked
When I saw 8 more cars pull into the back.
I had to more to room 9;
 
others moved up 8 rooms as
well.
Never more will I confuse a Hilton with a Hilbert
Hotel!
My mind got more twisted when I saw a bus without
end
With an infinite number of riders coming up to check
in.
“Relax,” said the nightman. “Here’s what we’ll do:
Move to the double of your room number:
that frees the odd-numbered rooms.”
Repeat Chorus
Last thing I remember at the end of my stay—
It was time to pay the bill but I had no means to pay.
The man in 19 smiled, “Your bill is on me.
20 pays mine, and so on, so you get yours for free!.”
Lyrics copyright 2000 Lawrence Mark Lesser, reprinted
with permission
Hotel Infinity
Lawrence Mark Lesser
Armstrong Atlantic State University
Savannah, GA
lesserla@mail.armstrong.edu
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A Geometry Course for Prospective Secondary School Teachers
Jeff Connor and Barbara Grover
Department of Mathematics
Ohio University
Athens, Ohio 45701
e-mail: connor@math.ohiou.edu or bgrover@math.ohiou.edu
High school graduates of the near future could be
more sophisticated geometers than their professors.
If the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
Standards [7] is adhered to, college-intending high-
school students will learn more than basic Euclidean
geometry. They will have worked with technological
aides to make discoveries and then made deductive
arguments to verify their conjectures ([7], 159) and
spherical geometry ([7], 160). They will have devel-
oped both deductive and inductive reasoning in part
by exploring geometry through short sequences of
axioms. Students entering college will have an “... ap-
preciation of Euclidean geometry as one of many axi-
omatic systems” ([7], 160).
That is, of course, if their high school teachers know
the material and can teach it effectively using the peda-
gogical techniques suggested in the NCTM guidelines
([7], [8]). The NCTM expects high school teachers to
introduce their students to spherical geometry, soft-
ware programs, axioms, and deductive reasoning and
proofs. In the classroom they are expected to incorpo-
rate tasks that require students to make and test con-
jectures and use manipulatives as well as to have stu-
dents work in cooperative groups. Moreover, they will
be expected to use a variety of methods to assess the
student’s progress in the course.
The geometry course described in this note is an at-
tempt to help prepare prospective teachers to meet
the goals described in the Standards. Some recent lit-
erature confirms that teachers teach material in the
way they were taught and that, to make effective use
of a pedagogical technique, it helps to have learned
the material by the same technique ([1], [2], [6]). With
the above in mind, we replaced the traditional “Foun-
dations of Geometry” course with one that incorpo-
rated technology, discovery learning in a cooperative-
group setting, and introduced students to non-Euclid-
ean geometry early in the course.
The “Foundations of Geometry” course we replaced
exhibited many features common to the majority of
the geometry courses offered to prospective high
school teachers in the United States [5]. It was taken
primarily by prospective teachers, lecture-based with
some group work, and made little use of
manipulatives and software tools. In our course, like
in about half such courses, the material was devel-
oped following Hilbert’s or Birkhoff’s axioms. First,
absolute geometry was developed and then, towards
the middle of the course, the parallel postulate was
introduced. At that time the students were introduced
to some spherical geometry and hyperbolic geometry.
The course then returned to Euclidean geometry to
develop similarity, area and properties of the circle.
For instance, that the angle sum of a triangle in Eu-
clidean geometry is 180° appeared as follows. The first
half of the course developed the incidence, between-
ness, and congruence theorems and geometric in-
equalities. The elliptic, hyperbolic and parallel postu-
lates were then introduced along with models of the
different types of geometries. Following this, using
Saccheri quadrilaterals, it was shown (as a theorem
of absolute geometry) that the angle sum of a triangle
is less than or equal to 180°. It was then shown (with-
out recourse to the result from absolute geometry) that
in Euclidean geometry the angle sum of a triangle is
180°. This struck the students as quite a bit of work to
get to something they “already knew.” A more seri-
ous difficulty with this approach was that there was
little to challenge the students’ high-school-based
knowledge of Euclidean geometry before hyperbolic
geometry was introduced. Hyperbolic geometry was
usually introduced several weeks into the course and
then (nearly) abandoned while similarity and other
Euclidean topics were studied. In addition, as the
proofs appeared to be merely confirming what the
students felt they already knew, the proofs did little
to promote a deeper understanding of the material.
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We replaced our traditional course with one that forces
students to confront what they ‘already know’ early
in the course. With the help of tools that secondary
teachers will eventually use in their own teaching, the
course creates a need for axioms and proofs to de-
scribe and work with different geometries. The new
course currently develops the topics using coopera-
tive group projects in the following order: area, the
angle sum of a triangle and the parallel postulates,
congruence of triangles, similarity of triangles, prop-
erties of circles, and transformational geometry. Dur-
ing these projects the students use tools such as the
Geometers’ Sketchpad, Non-Euclid (a software pro-
gram that models the Poincaré disc), the Lenart sphere
(a clear plastic sphere with a spherical protractor and
compass), a MIRA (a plastic device that acts as a mir-
ror to do reflections), Geoboards and, of course, a com-
pass and straight edge. Material that cannot be easily
introduced in the projects is introduced in lectures and
used for individual homework assignments. For in-
stance, the betweenness axioms are introduced along
with the exterior angle theorem in a lecture. About
70% of class time is spent with the students working
in cooperative groups with the remainder of the time
being used for lectures and exams.
Each project consists of two or three subprojects that
each require a written ‘progress report,’ and conclude
with the preparation of a final report that has the stu-
dents synthesize the findings of the subprojects and
correct any errors that appeared in the progress re-
ports. The progress reports and final reports form the
basis of a written dialog between the students and
the instructor.
A short discussion of the first two projects shows how
the assorted elements of the course fit together. The
first project has the students develop a theory of area.
The first subproject asks them to develop a procedure
for finding the area of a polygonal region assuming
they know how to a) find the area of a square and b)
find the area of a triangle. Students then use these
procedures to justify the standard formulas for the
area of a rectangle, parallelogram and trapezoid. This
work is followed by a lecture on axiom systems and
models. The second subproject has each group de-
velop a set of area axioms and then use the axioms to
prove their formulas from the first subproject. These
axioms are also discussed as a class. The third sub-
project has them use the Lenart sphere to test the va-
lidity of their axioms on the sphere and derive a for-
mula for the area of a spherical triangle. The final re-
port has them integrate the (corrected) results of the
subprojects into a single document. As part of their
work, the students are asked to identify any apparent
gaps or holes in their arguments, for instance, any
assumptions that they are making about length, the
area of a boundary, et cetera.
The second project addresses the angle sum of a tri-
angle. The students are first asked to develop a sys-
tem of axioms that allow them to prove that the sum
of the measures of the angles of a triangle is 180°; this
usually requires an axiom stating that alternate inte-
rior angles are congruent. In the second subproject
they explore the validity of their axioms and the exte-
rior angle theorem on the sphere and in the Poincaré
disc using the software program non-Euclid. This
progress report also requires each group to make a
conjecture about the area of a triangle in the Poincaré
disc. In the final report the students show that the
Euclidean parallel postulate in conjunction with the
exterior angle theorem yields that the angle sum of a
triangle is 180°. During this project there is a lecture
on the history of the parallel postulate and the devel-
opment of non-Euclidean geometry. (The angle sum
result for absolute geometry is proven later in the
course.)
At this stage the students are 6 to 7 weeks into the
course. The students have had significant exposure
to spherical geometry and the Poincaré disc. They
have been surprised to discover that the area of a tri-
angle is not always ‘half the base times the height’
and that the angle sum of a triangle is not always 180°.
The students go on to explore the congruence of tri-
angles, similarity and transformational geometry in
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. In the last two
projects the students investigate geometries through
the fixed points and lines of reflections and classify
motions in the plane.
In the early part of the course the students develop
their own axioms and lemmas for each project. As the
course progresses, to maintain some uniformity in the
axiomatic development, assorted key ‘axioms’ are
suggested to them; for instance, in the angle sum
project they are given the exterior angle theorem as
an axiom, and later in the course they establish it as a
theorem. Eventually, during the last two projects on
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transformational geometry they are given the defini-
tions and axioms they need for each subproject and
are asked to prove a variety of theorems. These
projects have them work extensively with the assorted
software tools and manipulatives that were intro-
duced earlier in the course. The definitions and axi-
oms are given without intui-
tive motivation or explana-
tion; it is up to the students
to ‘discover’ the intuitive
content of the definition
through the models devel-
oped during the course. For
instance, the students are
given the definition of fixed
points and fixed lines of a
motion and then, to help develop their intuition, are
asked to find the fixed points and lines of reflections
on a sphere and in a model of Euclidean geometry.
Most students benefited from this new course struc-
ture. From our observations, we concluded that stu-
dents improved in their ability to discuss mathemat-
ics, explain their mathematical thinking, and work
with others toward a common goal. On course evalu-
ations students reported that they deepened their un-
derstanding of geometry, that the group work and
computer software facilitated their understanding,
and that they increased their self-confidence to do ge-
ometry.
There are some drawbacks to the course. One is that,
as we implemented it, it requires quite a bit of class-
room time; to accommodate this we added a weekly
two hour lab to the course. As one would hope, we
were able to investigate the standard topics and ad-
dress additional concepts in the replacement course;
in particular, transformational geometry was explored
in much greater depth than in the traditional course.
It is possible that the same amount of material could
be investigated in a course with fewer contact hours
by having the groups do some work outside of class.
In our course most groups were able to do most of
their group work during class.
Another drawback is that since the students are de-
veloping the axioms in a nonstandard order, at least
two different axiom systems are introduced, and what
is an axiom one week may become a theorem the next
week, the students have some difficulty in seeing dif-
ferent sets of geometric axioms as coherent systems.
The instructor needs to monitor the groups closely to
prevent errors due to improperly blending axiom sys-
tems. For instance, the first two times the course was
taught transformations were introduced through
MIRAs and, as a result, the students tended to assume
that reflections exhibited all
the properties of reflections
in a Euclidean plane. Even
after working with reflec-
tions on a sphere, students
still slipped into making as-
sumptions based on their
initial work in the Euclidean
plane. Some of these prob-
lems can be avoided by
making the assumptions in the projects very explicit.
Even though there is occasionally some confusion
during the course, in the end it is worth the extra vigi-
lance to help the students develop the perspective
needed to appreciate the role of axioms in mathemat-
ics.
A drawback of a more mundane nature is that the
course can be very time consuming for the instructor.
Each group submits ten to twelve written reports dur-
ing a quarter. As the subprojects build on one another
and are used to prepare the final report, they need to
be graded promptly and carefully. Homework and
exams also need to be graded. In addition, organiz-
ing the class into cooperative groups requires the in-
structor to do more administrative work than a lec-
ture-based course.
A possible philosophical objection is that much of the
grade is based on cooperative work. Since coopera-
tive group work plays a large role in the course, group
grades constitute a significant portion of the indi-
vidual student’s final grade. In our courses thirty-five
to forty percent of the final grade was based on the
cooperative projects. Consequently, it is important to
be sure that the group grade reflects the sum of each
individual’s understanding of the material. One way
to help accomplish this is to give individual quizzes
at the conclusion of a project and make the combined
group score on the quizzes part of the group grade.
According to journal entries and (anonymous) student
evaluations, during our courses the students’ attitudes
regarding group grades changed from some concern
that some students would get undeserved credit to a
❝...we concluded that students improved in their
ability to discuss mathematics, explain their
mathematical thinking, and work with others
toward a common goal.
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general belief that they were fair.
Even though the course was designed with the needs
of prospective secondary teachers in mind, the course
is also appropriate for a mathematics student. It is, at
its core, a mathematics course. Except for a brief dis-
cussion of cooperative learning and group work (20
minutes), no class time is spent discussing pedagogy.
Since the course gives the student the experience of
mathematical discovery and actively learning math-
ematics, we believe it benefits the typical junior level
mathematics major and is a viable replacement for a
traditional “Foundations of Geometry” course.
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Big Bang disperses
Heart rub-a-dub calibrates
How in tune palpitates
Haiku: The Heart
Arnold L. Trindade
Glen Cove, N.Y.
How crystal white the ice cap Neptune head
Views the ocean; streaming ice waters beneath
Are lubricant carrying his body
Gliding steadily to the sea.
His equatorial giant twin, the Amazon,
Suckling the breast of dark rain clouds
Transfuses oxygen, a bloody, muddy flow,
The umbilical for starving embryos, millions.
A biopsy of the ice cap reveals
Microbes fungal, bacterial species,
As do probes in Amazon's forest hair:
Nesting plant, bird, lichen fair.
Who might guess 'neath the Atlantic deep
Antarctic waters meet unseen in tryst?
In kisses hugging, bedside currents, embraces
The Amazon body in earth's one living womb?
While the surface conflicts, retards proliferation
Of stagnating antigen-antibiotic abcesses
Deep under spherical transfusing blood says
Planet love, is, such flowing expecting no return.
Tryst of Twins:
Antarctica, Amazon
Arnold L. Trindade
Glen Cove, N.Y.
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EPIGRAPH
You can’t get there from here.
The classic Sam Loyd “Fifteen Puzzle” consists of fif-
teen movable and numbered square counters placed
in a random order in a four by four square frame. One
is allowed to slide a counter into an empty space, and
the goal is to arrive at the natural ordering of the
counters from a given initial arrangement by a se-
quence of such slides.
Theory shows that starting from half of the possible
original positions of the counters, the puzzle is solv-
able while from the other half it is insolvable. But a
simple interchange of any two counters will alter the
puzzle from solvable to insolvable or vice versa. Em-
bedding the board in three dimensions makes the
puzzle always solvable.
***
THE IMPETUS
The impetus for this paper came from a novel by
Apostolos Doxiadis, Uncle Petros and Goldbach’s Con-
jecture. In the novel, Petros, a mathematician, has set
his heart on solving the Goldbach Conjecture. Failing
and deeply disappointed, Petros takes psychological
refuge in the possibility offered by Gödel’s Theorem,
that the problem be insoluble. After reviewing this
novel for the SIAM NEWS, I began thinking about my
own reactions over the years to the Gödel Theorem
and to one particular aspect of it.
ON THE WORD “NAÏVE” IN THE TITLE
The amount of material related to Gödel’s Theorem is
enormous: it is far beyond anyone’s ability to know it
all or understand it. And the Web has multiplied the
chatter and blurred it into an incoherent mass of
thoughts.
I will approach my topic as I have experienced it in
my professional career as an applied mathematician
and as a writer. This is the meaning of the word
“naïve” in my title.
WHAT IS THE PARADOX?
Simply stated, the Paradox of Gödel is this: although
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem has been touted in
some quarters as the most significant mathematical
achievement of the 20th century, it seems to be of little
significance to the bulk of research mathematicians.
Why is this the case?
What is Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem? In nontech-
nical language one might say: if a mathematical state-
ment has been asserted that seems to make sense, it
may not be possible to prove whether the statement
is true or false.
Example: A claim has been made that there are an in-
finite number of 0’s in the decimal expansion of π. At
the moment, it is not known if this is true or false or if
it is undecidable.
I like to put the incompleteness theorem this way:
given a mathematical “there” and a “here,” you may
not be able to get there from here.
Slightly more technically: arithmetic is not completely
formalizable. For every consistent formalization of
arithmetic, there exist arithmetic truths that are not
provable in that system.
“There will always be arithmetic truths that escape
our ability to fence them in use the tools of rational
analysis” (John Casti).
In what follows, I will use the abbreviation GIT to
designate the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem, or more
generally, any of its closely related theorems or equiva-
lent formulations.
Naïve Thoughts on the Paradox of Gödel
Philip J. Davis
Division of Applied Mathematics
Brown University
Providence, RI 02912
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THE ROMANCE, THE HYPE, AND THE ICONOGRAPHY
SURROUNDING GÖDEL’S THEOREM
“An astounding and melancholy revelation” (Ernest
Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof, 1958).
“The most decisive result in mathematical logic”
(Boyer, A History of Mathematics, 2nd ed.).
“Amazing, shattering” (Morris Kline, Mathematics: The
Loss of Certainty).
“Mind boggling. One of the pinnacles of human in-
tellectual achievement. Basis for a whole host of re-
lated developments in philosophy, computer science,
linguistics, psychology. Mankind will never know the
final secret of the universe by rational thought (Casti,
Reality Rules, II).
“Only Einstein’s theory of General Relativity repre-
sents an accomlishment of comparable intellectual
grandeur” (Berlinsky, Black Mischief).
“GIT a part of a ‘golden braid’ of math , art and music
that penetrates the very nature of human conscious-
ness. Gödel-numbering has opened up vast new
worlds” (Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher and Bach).
One can find statements in semiotics, theology and
eschatology that are based on or allude to the GIT as
well as references to Gödel in novels:
The philosophers at the great universities
were, without exception, failed mathemati-
cians. When they were not examining much
of the vocabulary of civilized discourse to con-
clude that it, after all, lacked meaning, they
muttered Gödel, Russell, Hilbert, liking to
imply that they themselves had chosen phi-
losophy over mathematics to give themselves
a wider, though related intellectual field
(Renata Adler, Speedboat).
One can find references to Gödel in literary criticism
where, according to Simon Blackburn’s review of
Umberto Eco’s Kant and the Platypus, “prominent lit-
erary intellectuals often like to make familiar refer-
ence to the technical terminology of mathematical
logic.”
One such person is reported as opining that “Gödel
showed that every theory is inconsistent unless it is
supported from the outside. Derrida showed that
there is no outside” (New Republic Magazine, Feb 7,
2000).
There are web chats galore on the single topic of “False
Applications of the GIT,” although what is a “false”
application of mathematics and what is a “true” ap-
plication defy formalization, let alone common agree-
ment.
SOME “APPLICATIONS” OF THE GIT
I use the word “application” here to mean simply that
an argument of some sort has been put forward based
in some way on the GIT. The GIT serves as a point
d’appui for both specialists and the laity.
GIT suggests there is no final theory of physics
(Stephen Hawking).
GIT suggests that physics—identified with math-
ematical physics—might be inconsistent.
GIT suggeststhat not everything that is technically de-
sirable is technically possible (Jerome Wiesner).
GIT suggests that “whether we admit it or not all (po-
litical, social, military) actions end in the logic of tri-
age (i.e., judgements of priorities of action)” (Hans
Magnus Enzensberger, Civil Wars, 1994).
GIT suggests humans are not computers. Creativity
and intuitive powers are not the product of computer
programs (Roger Penrose).
(This last position has been seriously questioned by
Murray Gell-Mann.)
“I would be skeptical about the use of the GIT (as in
Penrose, 1991) for arguing the limitations of any kind
of intelligence” (Steve Smale).
GIT suggests that mathematics will become more and
more experimental (Chaitin).
GIT suggests that the foundations of mathematics both
philosophically and technically must come to grips
with stochasticity (i.e., the probabilistic element) (Gre-
gory Chaitin, David Mumford).
GIT suggests that there may be a “high level way of
viewing the mind/brain, involving concepts that do
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not appear on lower level” (Donald Hofstadter).
GIT suggests that mystical experiences may be the
only road to absolute knowledge (Paul Davies).
GIT suggests that since “the consistency of mathemati-
cal systems becomes an incalculable question. Thus,
even the exercise of mathematics involves an act of
faith” (John Polkinghorne, Physicist and Anglican
Priest, One World).
From these last two quotes, it is an easy step to say
the GIT suggests that God exists.
GIT suggests that “a religion based on a plurality of
religions may leave us forever struggling with an
Axiom of Religious Choice” (Sarah Voss, mathemati-
cian and minister, What Number is God?).
In a totally different direction, GIT may give aid and
comfort to the creators of computer viruses:
“For most plausible definition of ‘virus’, it is likely
that the GIT blocks the possibility of writing a pro-
gram that accepts all non-viruses and rejects all vi-
ruses” (Ernest Davis).
Thus, while each type of virus may be overcome on
an individual basis, no panacea can be found. If the
use of the word “virus” in both medical and computer
contexts is more than mere verbal play, the GIT may
suggest that a universal medical cure may be an im-
possibility.
Finally, there are features or “applications” of GIT that
feed into psychology. The nicest, most amusing expo-
sition of this occurs in Apostolos Doxiadis’ novel re-
ferred to above..
THE PAST AND PRESENT INDIFFERENCE OF THE
MATHEMATICIANS TO  THE GIT
If the GIT has caused turbulence in philosophy, if it
has caused earthquakes in logic, if discussions of the
GIT clog the printed page and the websites, how can
it be said that GIT is of little significance? And yet,
despite the storms that have raged and opinions al-
tered, research mathematicians—with the possible
exception of a few number theoreticians—have little
regard and less use for the GIT.
One colleague put it this way:
“I’ve been to many mathematical lectures and scien-
tific meetings all over the world. Not once did the
name of Gödel come up.”
Another colleague told me:
“I’ve never lost any sleep over the GIT. But I’m sure
that Hilbert did.”
Therein lies the paradox.
More generally, of course, research mathematicians
have had little use for mathematical logic or for the
philosophy or history of mathematics. None of these
is required knowledge for a Ph.D. in mathematics (nor
hardly even for computer science). The idea, for ex-
ample, that mathematics proceeds rigorously and rig-
idly from assumptions to conclusions by a set of al-
lowed logical steps, simply does not correspond to
the way that mathematics is either discovered, devel-
oped, accepted, justified, applied or presented.
If someone points out that, in principle, all accepted
mathematical proofs can be written out in the man-
ner of Russell and Whitehead’s proof that 1 + 1 = 2,  I
would say the phrase “in principle” is one of the
weaseliest expressions in the vocabulary of intellec-
tuals. In principle, a contemporary Robinson Crusoe
thrown naked onto an island well supplied with all
raw materials could produce an automobile that
worked.
Mathematicians work using traditional materials and
guidelines and have their own criteria for acceptance.
A real conceptual or metaphysical breakthrough oc-
curs perhaps every fifty years. Afterwards, the logi-
cians and philosophers move in and tell the world
what, exactly, the mathematicians have been doing.
Mark Steiner comments on the sociological phenom-
enon of mathematicians who ignore logic completely
in their description of the history and philosophy of
20th century mathematics and yet cite the GIT as one
of the most important recent results. His recently ap-
peared The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophi-
cal Problem does not mention the GIT.
While the GIT is a piece of mathematics created along
traditional lines, but applied to mathematics self-ref-
erentially, it must be regarded as an “inside job.”  On
the other hand, since it seems to limit what mathema-
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ticians will ever be able to accomplish, limiting the
independence of mathematical action, it is also an
“outside job.”
Numerous people have walked away from certain
parts of mathematics, either for conceptual or for utili-
tarian reasons, e.g., measure theory. They do not ac-
cept it. It has no gut meaning for them nor relevance
to their scientific work. The GIT paradox is part of
this phenomenon.
THE GIT AND THE FAMOUS UNSOLVED (OR ONLY LATELY
SOLVED) PROBLEMS
In Doxiadis’ novel, his hero uses GIT as an excuse for
calling quits to his intense labors on the Goldbach Con-
jecture.
The mathematical world is full of unsolved problems
and conjectures. Most conjectures fail to gain notori-
ety, primarily because they
are not associated with a
“great name.” Mathemati-
cians lose interest in them,
so hence they are not
worked over for long peri-
ods of time. Many of these,
in number theory especially,
have been listed in such books as Daniel Shanks’ Solved
and Unsolved Problems in Number Theory and Richard
Guy’s Unsolved Problems in Number Theory.
Neither of these books breathes the name of Gödel. It
is probably the case that most of the conjectures listed
in these books are decidable one way or another. The
difficulty or the depth of a conjecture can only be
guessed, but some measure of it may be gleaned from
the rewards ($25, $100, etc. 100,000 pre-WWI German
marks for Fermat) that are sometimes offered for a
solution by some of the proposers.
THE GIT: ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MYTHS OR ARCHETYPES
OF MATHEMATICS?
The fact that the GIT has contemporary applications,
implications or suggestions relative to a wide variety
of fields ranging from cognition, physics, and philoso-
phy, to literature, theology, and politics, gives it a spe-
cial and remarkable status among mathematical state-
ments. The educated laity seem to be attracted to it as
iron to a magnet or as the devout to an icon. The name
Gödel can create a best seller or fill a large lecture
room. It can also do the reverse. This is part of the
paradox and adds to the unique status of the GIT. It
would be impossible to make such wide claims for,
e.g., Gershgorin’s theorem in matrix theory, or indeed
for any of the theorems employed routinely in daily
research. One would have to go back to the mental
world of the Pythagoreans or neo-Platonists (ancient
or contemporary) to find statements, contexts and at-
titudes of equal popularity.
One might very well call such a piece of mathematics
a fundamental symbol or myth in the sense of the psy-
chologist Jung. Jungian archetypes carry many inter-
pretations; it is also the case that many explanations
have been advanced for the Paradox of Gödel.
A BASKET OF EXPLANATIONS OR DENIALS
My object now is to record a wide variety of reasons
that have been given to explain the Paradox of Gödel
and then to set forth my
own naive reasons.
The GIT is equivalent to
Turing’s theorem about the
unsolvability of the Halting
Problem. I don’t think that
has any practical conse-
quences for real life computation which deals
with finite memory and finite computation
times. It just shows the vast gap between what
is of metaphysical interest and practical inter-
est. Similar discrepancies abound in econom-
ics and in fluid dynamics (Reuben Hersh).
Tying the matter a bit more closely to the philosophy
of mathematics, Hersh goes on to say:
It seems to me that most or all issues of math-
ematical philosophy are important in some
sense independent of concrete specific ex-
amples or applications.
For instance, is there really an infinite set, or is
it just something we imagine? From a philo-
sophical viewpoint, this is a very basic, fun-
damental question. But for mathematical
work, it doesn’t make any difference, and
many mathematicians couldn’t care less about
it.
❝One might very well call such a piece of math-
ematics a fundamental symbol or myth...
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Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is a math-
ematical result with philosophical import. It
has limited mathematical import. Which
shows that mathematical and philosophical
import are not the same thing (Hersh).
For mathematicians, however, his [Gödel’s]
theorem was of marginal interest, since Gödel
worked with a far more formal definition of
proof than that to which they aspired (or still
do); so the separation of logic and mathemat-
ics continued largely unchanged (Ivor Grattan-
Guinness, The Rainbow of Mathematics).
I don’t find it [the paradox] paradoxical. You
can compare the GIT to Liouville’s proof of the
existence of transcendental numbers. It is an
example of a phenomenon, but it is of no help
for interesting number like e or π...One aspect
of the matter, not a direct consequence of the
GIT, but coming out of that development, is
the work on unsolvable decision problems that
has had a serious impact in certain fields, e.g.,
finitely presented groups (Martin Davis).
“The infinite is not the issue. It is the case that the GIT
has implications for finite memory and finite compu-
tation time” (Ernest Davis).
As far as applied mathematics goes, there is
considerable evidence that all scientifically
applicable mathematics depends on weak sys-
tems of set theory, even conservative over
arithmetic. No new axioms are necessary (Sol
Feferman).
Question: does Feferman’s observation about weak
systems constitute a descriptive hypothesis that lim-
its the structure of physical theories just as the Church-
Turing Hypothesis (the Turing machine models all
possible computations) limits the nature of computa-
tion?
Most mathematicians don’t know or care
about logic and they see the GIT as a kind of
curiosity. It says nothing about the
undecidability of the problems they happen
to be working on. It provides no decision pro-
cedure for deciding beforehand whether a
given statement in mathematics is or isn’t de-
cidable.
If they took the possibility of undecidability
seriously, if they agreed, for example, that with
probability one, a proposition given at random
is undecidable, they would be discouraged
away from the field. Mathematicians use their
insights, judgements, experience, to enable
them to focus on statements which turn out to
be decidable(John Casti).
A parallel from physics The response of math-
ematicians to GIT has been rather like the re-
sponse of physicists to general relativity in the
period roughly from 1916-1960. Physicists
understood that Einstein’s results were in
some way quite fundamental, but because
general relativity seemed so definitely a sin-
gular achievement, physicists tended to ignore
its implications while ceremoniously paying
lip service to its grandeur...
Mathematicians are instinctively inclined to
assume that if the GIT and nearby results are
as important as logicians seem to think they
are, then it should be possible to use those re-
sults to discover something beyond the results
themselves. Nothing has yet emerged.
It is possible for a result to have immense im-
portance for a discipline without leading to
anything interesting within the discipline
(David Berlinski).
It is not the case that GIT has contributed little to math
or computer science. A fair number of interesting prob-
lems have been proven unsolvable using a reduction
to the GIT. The best known is Hilbert’s Tenth Prob-
lem. There are numerous other results in number
theory, logic, computation theory, discrete math and
algebra, e.g., the Paris-Harrigton result which states
that the Ramsey theorem is not provable within num-
ber theory.
But just wait a bit! Things might change! Mathemati-
cians have tended to ignore the GIT because it seemed
to have no connection to other parts of mathematics.
However, in the past twenty years, this has changed
somewhat. Harvey Friedman’s work has shown that
incompleteness theorems do have a very real mean-
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #2416
ing for number theory. But the fact remains that the
connection is weak in that it seems to point to noth-
ing more than oddities in the structure of arithmetic.
This may or may not change.
ANTI-GÖDELIAN DOUBTS
The GIT seems to have come as a surprise to neither
to John von Neumann nor to Norbert Wiener ( S.J.
Heims: “John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener”).
“The mathematical fraternities’ actual experiences
with its subject give little support to the assumption
of the existence of an a priori concept of mathemati-
cal rigor” (John von Neumann, The Mathematician).
Further down the spectrum there are anti-Gödelian
doubts:
“...it is commonplace that Wittgenstein rejected
Gödel’s proof [i.e., the GIT] because he did not, or even
could not, understand it” (Juliet Floyd).
The GIT is based on a chimera. The formaliza-
tion of mathematics assumes its representation
in a set of recognizable signs that are beyond
questioning. The metamathematics however
is stymied by the ambiguity (incoherence) in
how those signs are actually viewed. The
metamathematical argument of the GIT col-
lapses into confusion. Since the whole enter-
prise of formalization is not feasible, GIT is
redundant. No wonder mathematicians are
not bothered by it in their work (Miriam
Yevick).
THE WAY I SAW THE PARADOX
I first heard of the GIT around 1941, when I was a
college undergraduate. The GIT was then ten years
old. It caused no alarm in me. The bottom line seemed
quite reasonable. There were mathematical problems
I could not solve. I had heard that there were prob-
lems that no one had yet been able to solve. I knew
that there were problems, which, as stated, provably
had no solution.
An example: working in the plane, connect three
houses by curves, to the “electric, gas, and water
works” so that the curves do not intersect. (But in real
life we connect them in 3-d).
Another example: the squaring of the circle by ruler
and compass. Or, perhaps more significantly, the
“demonstration that Euclid’s Parallel Postulate” can-
not be derived from the other postulates. Thus, there
appear to be many problems that were impossible to
solve in the way they have been formulated.
This being the case, and arguing by analogy, GIT
seemed to me to be reasonable. As in the Fifteen Puzzle
cited in the Epigraph, you might not be able to get
“there” from “here.” Of course, these examples are
specific problems within mathematics and the GIT is
a theorem about theorems. Up a metalevel, or is it?.
But the proof of the independence of the parallel axiom
is a proof that there can be no proofs of dependence.
So the disparity of levels did not bother me. However
regarded, these analogies were strong enough for me.
(But not strong enough, apparently, for Frege, Russell,
Hilbert, et al. Is this yet another paradox?)
The idea of mapping formulas onto integers (Gödel
Numbering) seemed ingenious, but a bit dubious. The
Gödel numbers are so large! What kind of existence
can be attributed to them ? Do they really function in
the way that 1, 2, 3 do? Are these numbers being used
in different ways that really do not mesh with one
another or with the numbers of everyday arithmetic?
(I was, and still, am a “weak finitist.”)
And then came the coup de grace. Nothing but a com-
plicated form of the Liar Paradox. Hence a self-refer-
ential swindle, a trick of language.
So while I was quite willing to accept the bottom line
of the GIT, I did not care much for the proof. I did not
need the whole Gödelian apparatus to convince my-
self that I couldn’t lift myself up by my own boot-
straps either physically, mentally, or mathematically.
To add to my undergraduate skepticism, why was the
world famous logician W.V.O. Quine, with whom I
was even then studying mathematical logic, in the
Department of Philosophy at Harvard and not in the
Department of Mathematics? Obviously, the Harvard
Mathematics Department considered mathematical
logic to be irrelevant to their interests. In point of fact,
this was my first perception of the Paradox of Gödel.
MY CURRENT VIEWS
To discuss GIT and the Paradox, as Reuben Hersh
pointed out above, one might very well go into the
logic, the philosophy and metaphysics of mathemat-
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ics, metamathematics and cognition. What is a legiti-
mate mathematical object, existentially? What are le-
gitimate constructions or operations? What is truth?
What is proof? How can we recognize what makes
sense and what doesn’t? What does it mean to
“know”?  What sense does it make to say that “it will
never be known whether the statement X is true or
false”? What does it mean to explain anything?
I shall bypass all these. I will not look for an explana-
tion in terms of logical structures or the relative
strengths and weaknesses of axiom systems. I will go
for what might be called a historical view of the   mat-
ter.
Toward this end, one should realize that at various
times actual mathematical practice has been other than
what it is claimed to be in an ideal and hence limited
sense. Over the years, I came to believe that the “stan-
dard” view of mathematics as consisting of hypotheti-
cal-deductive structures is a totally inadequate de-
scription of how I (personally) have understood and
internalized mathematics; how I applied mathemat-
ics to itself or to the outside world, or how I created
new mathematics.
Historically, there are many times and places in math-
ematics where mathematics has said “impossible,”
“no way.” Some of these impossibilities are hinted at
in the persistence of old mathematical terminology,
e.g., negative, irrational, imaginary numbers. Another
impossibility: no general formula involving a finite
number of simple operators and root extractions can
be found for the solution of the quintic equation. Yet,
the history of mathematics displays all these and
many, many more impossibilities and contradictions
(e.g., Heaviside’s operational calculus; Dirac’s delta
function) being bypassed, legitimized, co-opted, of-
ten by the method of context extension.
I began to wonder about the notion of proof, a pro-
cess absolutely fundamental within a certain view of
Figure 1
The Hydra of Mathematical Impossibility is slain by the Hercules of context extension. (From Davis and Park, 1987.)
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mathematics, but proof was not identical understand-
ing. Moreover, proof was subsequent to deciding that
initially there was something there to prove. And the
axioms were statements designed post hoc long after
a substantial corpus of mathematics was in place. (In
the case of arithmetic with Frege in 1884! Was there
no valid arithmetic till then?).I began to feel that what
was important was “mathematical evidence,”of which
proof is only one component.
I began to wonder about the concept known as con-
sistency. To be inconsistent, mathematically speaking,
is to commit the primal sin. If one allows one contra-
diction, one can demonstrate anything at all. But can
one really say with absolute objectivity, finality, and
without relativistic allusions, what consistency con-
sists of when there is a historical record of a constant
patching up of mathematical inconsistencies in a way
that makes them disappear? (Imre Lakatos)
An up-to-date example: consider the arithmetic sys-
tem that is embodied in the popular and useful scien-
tific computer package known as MATLAB. MATLAB
yields the following two contradictory statements:
(The symbol == means “is the equality true or false?”)
Input Output
(1) l e-50 == 0, false
(2) 2 + l e-50 == 2, true.
Yet, MATLAB arithmetic is a (finite, but large) math-
ematical structure. Operations can be carried out.
Certain inputs lead to certain outputs. These might
be called MATLAB truths or theorems. The computa-
tion itself is the proof or the validation of these truths.
They are deemed useful by the scientific community.
The structure has its own integrity in that it consists
of just what it consists of and it does just what it does.
Yet, when judged by certain other ideal structures
MATLAB embodies contradictions. While the God of
Consistency does not thunder nor shake the earth in
the presence of these logical irrationalities, one might
well ask whether these contradictions can lead to er-
ror or disaster when MATLAB is employed in physi-
cal applications. They can, but “knowledgeable” pro-
gramming makes the likelihood small. In any case,
“ideal” mathematical computations (if indeed they
can be carried out) might also lead to disaster.
Incidentally, I believe that Wittgenstein deplored “the
superstitious fear of mathematicians for contradic-
tions” (quoted in Karl Menger’s Reminiscences of the
Vienna Circle).
Rejecting mathematical platonism, formalism,
logicism, and constructivism, I adopted a position that
has been called variously “social constructivism,”
“quasi-empiricism,” or “humanism.”
THE PARADOX OF GÖDEL: MY EXPLANATION
Is this an explanation? Not really; just some thoughts
conjured up by thinking about the paradox.
Mathematics is a living organism.  The modes of its
discoveries, developments, justifications, and inter-
pretations cannot be formalized in a few paragraphs–
if at all. They are time dependent and hence cannot
be set down once and for all.
The development of mathematics either as a manu-
factured or a discovered corpus, goes forward to a
great extent without set global goals. As it goes for-
ward, year by year, what it turns up can be quite for-
tuitous, serendipitous, perhaps even interesting; in
such a case, the arrival at a theorem is automatically
accompanied by evidence of its validity or relevance,
sometimes even by its proof.
Mathematics moves forward from statements already
in place that suggest other statements. One of the goals
then becomes to arrive at a proof of the suggestions.
But the researcher is borne forward by a trust in a kind
of “principle of continuity” (which admittedly can be
dead wrong, see the “Fifteen Puzzle”) implying that
statements “close” to proved statements are them-
selves provable or disprovable.
In the older Eastern tradition, explicit proof is often
missing. In the Western tradition, the notions of what
is proof and what is provability evolved slowly and
simultaneously with the discovery or creation of much
material that was in fact provable. Alongside this,
there grew the dominating or establishment view of
mathematics as a logically deductive enterprise. The
steady supply of proofs and the demand for more,
interacting upon one another, grew together. The char-
acterizing notion of mathematics as proved theorems
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grew with equal steps with the success in proving
those theorems even as the notion of what constituted
a valid proof altered and changed with time. The con-
cept of what constitutes a proof has no finality; it de-
velops alongside the material on which it operates.
Contemporary histories of mathematics present what
is often called “Whiggian history.” That is, they pro-
mote the current established view of mathematics as
deductive structures, and they interpret the math-
ematical past as leading inevitably to the established
present.
If it should have turned out that a good many of the
statements deemed interesting by mathematicians or
scientists were unprovable,
or undeterminable whether
they were unprovable, then
the view of the mathemati-
cal enterprise as it devel-
oped in the 19th and 20th
centuries, an enterprise that
set increasing store by de-
ductive proof, would have become untenable.
In such a case, mathematics would not have disap-
peared. It would be an art with a special vocabulary
and modus operandi, a form of rhetorical discussion,
a set of procedures, suggestions or rules as to how the
world might be organized, and the GIT would be both
true and irrelevant.
AS REGARDS THE FUTURE.
In my opinion the most significant mathematical de-
velopment of the 20th century has been the computer
in all its ramifications, mathematical, scientific and
social. Having done scientific computation in the pre-
electronic days as well as with contemporary very-
high-level “tool kits,” I still tend to think of the com-
puter as a “mathematical instrument.” But this view
and a related view that the computer is a “logical en-
gine,” an “algorithm cruncher,” though historically
accurate, may now be as obsolete as the horse and
buggy. What is replacing it?
Programmed computation, i.e., algorithms, and de-
ductive proof have common features. But the future
dominance of the algorithm–and the GIT is algorith-
mic in structure–has been questioned. Since it is fun-
damental to all digital communication in the same
way the elementary particles of physics are fundamen-
tal to a Hawaiian wedding luau, there are some signs
that the algorithm may have to share the center stage
of technological and instructional emphasis or even
to retire to the wings.
Here are a few straws in the wind:
Computer scientist Peter Wegner thinks that in the
future the emphasis will shift from algorithmic mod-
els of computation to interactive models. We have now
reached the point where a single computer has be-
come a basic “elementary particle” of information in-
teraction, to be combined with myriads of other indi-
vidual computers and acted
on non-algorithmically by
the whole exterior environ-
ment, human and non-hu-
man.
“Interactive systems are
grounded in an external re-
ality both more demanding and richer than the rule
based world of noninteractive algorithms” (Wegner).
“The conventional metaphor [for computation] will
be replaced by the notion of a community of interact-
ing entities” (Lynn A. Stein).
By way of a parallel within mathematics:
Mathematics has been regarded traditionally
as ‘theorems.’ It is now becoming the study of
structures. Until the 20th century, there have
been only two structures: geometry and arith-
metic. Now there are many (David Mumford).
 (MATLAB , mentioned earlier, is just one of the more
fairly recent ones.)
While by no means neglecting the algorithm, we must
surely add to the idea of structures the notion of
stochasticity as a prime element of the future compo-
sition of mathematics.
“The intellectual world as a whole will come to view
logic as a beautiful elegant idealization but to view
statistics as the standard way in which we reason and
❝The concept of what constitutes a proof has no
finality; it develops alongside the material on
which it operates.
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think” (David Mumford).
Working with the material of a structure and employ-
ing its rules, the mathematical culture goes forward
from “here” by successive steps and arrives at a
“there.” Often probabalistically and non-
algorithmically and even multivalently. The delivery
of the “there” from the “here” may be regarded as
proof in an extended sense. Whether the “there” is in
any way interesting or appealing or suggestive or
useful or whether it corresponds to a “there” desired
in advance is altogether another issue.
By now the ideas elaborated by Gödel, Church,
Turing, and Post have passed entirely into the
body of mathematics where themes and
dreams and definitions are all immured, but
the essential idea of an algorithm blazes forth
from any digital computer, the unfolding of
genius having passed inexorably from Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem to Space Invaders
VTT rattling on an arcade Atari (David
Berlinski: The Advent of the Algorithm: The Idea
that Rules the World).
The GIT is moving off center stage, a place it never
really occupied. Like the ideas of Freud which now
appear more in literature than in therapy, it will sur-
vive as an archetypal statement from which all kinds
of inferences–mainly non-mathematical–will continue
to be drawn.
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SUMMARY
A set of problems is presented and discussed for which
there is a tendency for students to ignore part of the
given information in the problem and to substitute
some extraneous assumptions. Typical student reac-
tions are also discussed.
***
This article is about a very interesting and very spe-
cific class of non-routine mathematics problems. I dis-
covered this particular type of problem in part from
teaching a mathematics content course for prospec-
tive teachers that has a strong emphasis on problem
solving, and from giving workshops to prepare pro-
spective teachers for the mathematics questions on the
New York State Teachers Certification Examination.
Of course, there have been many books and papers
written about problem solving in mathematics (for
example, [2], [5]). There have been studies of prob-
lems with too little information, problems with redun-
dant information, problems with no possible solution
(for example, [1]), and many other classifications.
However, the class of problems to be discussed here
does not seem to have been considered separately.
Here is a simple initial problem to illustrate the main
idea. Krutetskii ([1], p. 142) gives the following prob-
lem:
One leg of a right triangle is equal to 7 cm. Determine the
other two sides if they are expressed in integers.
The solution would be that the other two sides are 24
cm and 25 cm, but Krutetskii states that students faced
with this problem would often claim that it could not
be solved because a triangle cannot be determined if
only one side is given. The student is forgetting, or
perhaps ignoring, the condition that the other two
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sides must be integers. This raises the question of
what causes the student to ignore this condition. Is it
that (s)he does not know how to use this informa-
tion? Or is it that (s)he does not think that the condi-
tion is relevant?
This is an example of the class of problem I wish to
consider here, namely problems in which the student
tends to ignore some given condition in the problem. I have
found remarkably few problems which seem to fit
this requirement exactly, and I will present them here.
It is interesting to consider just what it is about these
particular problems that causes the student to ignore
a relevant portion of the given information in a prob-
lem. Frequently, the students are inclined to substi-
tute some extraneous assumption of their own for the
information which they are ignoring, as will be illus-
trated in the following examples.
The problem which originally suggested to me this
idea of ignoring part of the given information is the
following ([3]):
Four men, one of whom has committed a crime, made the
following statements:
Arch says: Dave did it.
Dave says: Tony did it.
Gus says: I didn’t do it.
Tony says: Dave lied when he said I did it.
If only one of these statements is true, who was the guilty
man?
I have presented this problem at large workshops, and
I have been somewhat surprised to find that invari-
ably the students ignored the condition that only one
of the statements is true. Typically they suggest rea-
sons for their choice that are based on some sort of
psychological argument, for example: “Gus must
have done it, because he didn’t accuse anyone else,”
or “Tony must have done it, since he accused Dave of
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lying.” The students are substituting some sort of ex-
traneous assumption for the given condition that only
one statement is true, perhaps because they do not
see how to apply this condition, or do not see how it
is relevant. To solve this correctly, one could use this
condition to test the possibility of each man’s guilt.
This would reveal that the correct answer is that Gus
was guilty, for only in that case is exactly one state-
ment true; if any of the others were guilty, then two
or more of the statements would be true. Perhaps the
idea of considering separate cases (i.e., what if Arch
is guilty, what if Dave is guilty, etc.) does not occur to
the students because they have not experienced many
problems which are solved through the strategy of
using cases.
Another example of this phenomenon appears in [4]:
Exactly one of the following statements is false:
a) Audrey is older than Beatrice.
b) Clement is younger than Beatrice.
c) The sum of the ages of Beatrice and Clement is twice
the age of Audrey.
d) Clement is older than Audrey.
Who is the youngest—Audrey, Beatrice, or Clement?
Here too, students are inclined to ignore the condi-
tion that exactly one of the statements is false. For
example, they may look at only two of the statements,
say (a) and (b), and conclude from them that Clement
is the youngest, ignoring the presence of the other
statements. Similarly, they may look at only statements
(a) and (d), and conclude quickly that Beatrice is the
youngest. Occasionally they will see that statements
(a), (b), and (d) contradict each other and will errone-
ously conclude that the problem cannot be solved. The
students may tend to pay less attention to statement
(c) because it is harder to understand, or because it
involves consideration of the arithmetic operation of
summing. They fail to realize that statement (c) im-
plies that Audrey’s age must be in between the other
two ages (if all ages are different). Again, one could
simply consider each of the four statements in turn,
and ask, “If this statement were the false one, could
the other three be all true simultaneously without con-
tradiction?” In this way one could eventually deter-
mine that the only possibility is for (b) to be the false
statement, which would make Beatrice the youngest.
A fourth problem, which the readers may have seen
in one form or another, is the following:
Mrs. Adams and Mrs. Brown, two math teachers, are walk-
ing over to Mrs. Brown’s house after school.
Mrs. A:How many children do you have?
Mrs. B: I have three children.
A: What are their ages?
B: The product of their ages is 36.
A: [Thinks for a moment] That’s not enough information
to figure out their ages.
[By now, the two of them are at Mrs. Brown’s driveway, so
that Mrs. Adams can see the number on Mrs. Brown’s
house.]
B: The sum of their ages is the number on the house.
A: [Thinks for a moment] That’s still not enough infor-
mation, I still can’t figure out their ages.
B: The oldest child is visiting her grandmother.
A: [Instantly] Now I know their ages!
What are the ages of Mrs. Brown’s children?
To solve this problem, one would first list all combi-
nations of three whole numbers whose product is 36,
as possible candidates for the ages of the three chil-
dren. When Mrs. Adams is told that the sum of the
ages of the children is the number on Mrs. Brown’s
house (which she knows), she states that she still can-
not determine the children’s ages. Among the triplets
of whole numbers whose product is 36, only two such
triplets have the same sum: 2+2+9=13 and 1+6+6=13;
all other sums are distinct. Therefore if the house num-
ber was anything other than 13, Mrs. Adams would
know the ages of the children as soon as she is told
that the sum of the ages is the house number. The fact
that she still cannot determine their ages at this point
implies that the house number must have been 13.
Then, when Mrs. Adams is told something about the
“oldest child,” she knows that the answer must be 2,
2, and 9, because in the combination of 1, 6, and 6,
there is no “oldest” child.
In this problem almost invariably students will ignore
the given fact that the sum of the children’s ages is
the number on the house. It seems apparent that this
is because they do not see how this information can
be used without the actual value of the house num-
ber. In fact, when the problem is posed, the students
often ask, “What is the number on the house?” Some-
times they will state that the problem cannot be solved
without the house number being given. In this prob-
lem I have seen all sorts of extraneous assumptions
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introduced to replace the clause which is ignored. For
example, they may assume that the oldest child must
be at least, say, 12 years old in order to be allowed to
visit her grandmother on her own. Or, they may as-
sume that the oldest child must be under 6 years of
age (i.e. the answer must be 3, 3, and 4) because oth-
erwise she would have to be at school that day (it is a
school day, since the teachers were going home from
school!) and could not be visiting her grandmother.
In one highly unusual case, a student came to me and
asked “Is the grandmother dead?” The student ex-
plained that she wanted to know this because if the
answer was yes, then the oldest child was actually
visiting her grandmother’s grave site at a cemetery,
and she thought that children under age 18 might not
be permitted to visit a cemetery. It seems that students
think that the grandmother is somehow relevant be-
cause they are accustomed to textbook problems in
which only the necessary information is given, and
they assume that if the grandmother were not relevant,
then she would not be mentioned.
The four problems shown above have in common a
tendency for students to ignore an actual given con-
dition in the problem. Below is one more problem
which is closely related in this regard, but with a slight
difference:
What is the greatest amount of money (i.e., the maximum
VALUE) in coins (up through half-dollars; no dollar coins)
that you can have and still not be able to give someone
change for any of the following: a nickel, a dime, a quarter,
a half dollar, or a dollar?
In this problem students sometimes erroneously as-
sume that you must have at least one of each type of
coin (from a penny through a half-dollar, inclusive).
Alternatively, students may incorrectly assume that
the amount of money must be less than a dollar. (Ac-
tually the correct answer is $1.19; a half dollar, a quar-
ter, four dimes and four pennies, but no nickels.) This
is similar to some of the preceding problems in that
students tend to make extraneous assumptions. How-
ever, it differs from the foregoing in that in this case
the assumptions which cause the students to overlook
possible solutions do not involve ignoring a given con-
dition of the problem, as in the earlier examples. How-
ever, the tendency to overlook possible solutions is
more common than altogether disregarding a part of
the given information in a problem.
An interesting but perhaps difficult question for fu-
ture study would be to examine why it is that stu-
dents respond differently to these types of problems
as compared with other non-routine problems. Is it
possible to identify some commonality among these
problems which provokes this unusual response, and
how can we help our students to focus more on the
meaning of the given information rather than intro-
ducing superfluous assumptions? Finally, I would be
interested in hearing from readers any suggestions of
other non-routine problems which would fall into the
category discussed here.
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“Common sense is the collection of prejudices acquired by
age eighteen.”
--Albert Einstein
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ABSTRACT
This paper intends to give rationales for the need to
diversify the ranks of teachers of mathematics. It also
suggests ideas that we can take to alleviate the situa-
tion that we currently are confronting.
***
“It is essential to have a workforce of strong math-
ematics teachers that reflect the demographic charac-
teristics of the student population.” This claim is taken
from NCTM’s position statement on The Mathematics
Education of Underrepresented Groups. My personal feel-
ings dictate that a reader’s immediate idea of charac-
teristic is purely based on ethnicity. However, the char-
acteristics (I prefer referring to them as gaps) of our
classrooms encompass many other points that, to
name a few, include gender, culture, language, socio-
economic status, physical and learning abilities, etc.
No one can argue against the fact that our classrooms
today are getting more and more diversified. Keep-
ing up with these changes is indeed not only chal-
lenging but also important. Allow me to discuss some
of these gaps.
One of the known gaps we have right now is gender.
According to the report of the National Education
Association (NEA) in 1997 entitled “Status of the
American Public School Teachers, 1995-96,” there were
about 2,164,000 teachers in the USA. Of these teach-
ers, females comprised 74.4% as compared to 25.6%
of male teachers! Aside from the incongruity in the
ratio of female to male, it also is necessary to look
where teachers are primarily concentrated. Most of
the female teachers are in elementary schools, and
most of the male teachers are in mathematics and sci-
ence disciplines and most likely in high schools. The
way I look at it, this is a troubling scenario since our
students now have fewer and fewer role models to
look up to. Let’s face it, some issues and incidents that
students confront are better confided to someone of
the same gender.
Next comes the racial makeup of our teachers and stu-
dents. If one asks what percent of K-12 students are
minorities, would you know it to be nearly 30%? Fo-
cusing on the teachers, do we know it to be about 13%?
Or that over 40% of schools in the US do not have a
faculty member who is a person of color? Quite eye-
openers, aren’t they? We can no longer deny the fact
that our students are getting more and more diverse,
but our teachers do not match the rate. Is there really
a reason for concern? Frankly, yes, there is. A report
of The Mathematical Association of America (MAA)
entitled Attracting Minorities into Teaching Mathemat-
ics Executive Summary provided one good reason by
stating that “a diverse teaching force shows all stu-
dents that minorities can do mathematics and that di-
versity is a positive component of American society.”
Another reason is that we need to show these students
that they too can achieve and that mathematics is in-
trinsic to us. Our students must be set to succeed in
their undertakings. We, as teachers, should lead our
students to the right avenues.
Reading the NCTM position statement again, the
word strong is an area of concern. I do believe that
when we say “strong” we mean “qualified.” With
what we currently have, our teaching force is not
“strong.” According to the Digest of Education Statis-
tics 1997, of a total of 1,158,788 Bachelor ’s degrees
awarded in 1994-95, 9% were in Education and 1.2%
were in Mathematics! Of the 397,052 Master’s degrees,
25% went to Education and 1% went to Mathematics.
Furthermore, more than one-fourth of newly hired
teachers do not have the necessary license. To com-
plicate the situation, 12% have no license at all, and
another 15% have temporary licenses. Add to that the
fact that 22% of our new teachers abandon the profes-
sion within the first three years. Do we even dare to
look into how many teachers leave after ten years?
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What can we do? We need to make these situations
known to the public. We no longer can be silent and
wait for things to happen; otherwise things will just
bypass us. We need to speak to hiring bodies about
the necessity to diversify the ranks of mathematics
teachers. We, as a world, are getting closer each time,
and each day that passes brings this reality more and
more real. Many actions still are needed to achieve
equity and to have an effective teaching work force.
More recruitment is needed, and the profession has
to be made more lucrative and more inviting. We need
to write to our lawmakers to demand that this pre-
dicament be looked at and to lobby for the improve-
ment of teaching conditions. Actions need to be taken,
and they have to be taken now! Time, as we all know
it, is fast running out. It will be sad for us to realize
that because of negligence, this problem will be be-
yond rectifying.
What I have presented here are current realities in our
classrooms. If we are to uphold GOALS 2000 in mak-
ing sure that there will be a talented, dedicated, and well-
prepared teacher in every classroom, we have to consider
and make this a priority! Let us be reminded that in
the next ten years we will need at least two million
new teachers. If things remain status quo, the ques-
tion is no longer, “What kind of future will we have?”
but simply, “What future?”
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Editor’s Note: This article comes from a talk presented by
UCSMP Director Zalman Usiskin at the Fifteenth Annual
UCSMP Secondary Conference, November 6-7, 1999. It is
reprinted with permission from the UCSMP Newsletter.
As I polish these remarks, it is 11/5/99. Need we say
more to realize that our calendar is a mathematical
model of time? This model is based on our position in
the universe. One orbit of the Sun is a year. We judge
our age in orbits; we often think of both current events
and history in terms of tens and hundreds of orbits—
that is, in decades and centuries. This shows the in-
fluence of base 10 on our thinking. As we hit the junc-
ture of the beginning of an orbit numbered 2000, we
are reminded of this mathematical model.
This seems to be an appropriate time to review recent
orbits. My goal is to do this in a way that will be inter-
esting and informative. I have picked the last 50 or-
bits as my time frame because this interval covers the
schooling of most of your students and their parents.
THE NEW MATH ERA
There is also a conceptual reason for beginning in 1950.
In 1951, three faculty members in mathematics and
education at the University of Illinois began the first
of the new math projects, UICSM. Six years later, in
1957, the new math received its biggest push when
the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first artificial satel-
lite. Sputnik was neither a small nor an isolated feat.
It built on the work of German rocket scientists that
had started 15 years earlier in World War II and its
186 pound weight, followed the next month by the
half-ton Sputnik II, showed that the Soviets had the
capability to send a large missile anywhere in the
world.
Within a year, the U.S. Congress passed the National
Defense Education Act, which included sizeable funds
for curriculum reform. These funds allowed the fledg-
ling School Mathematics Study Group (SMSG), which
had been initiated just a year before, to become the
largest research and development project in math-
ematics education the U.S. has ever seen.
The work of SMSG was hailed widely by all connected
with mathematics and education. The euphoria of the
time is perhaps best represented by a 1963 report of
The Cambridge Conference on School Mathematics
entitled Goals for School Mathematics. In it, a group of
25 distinguished mathematicians from Harvard, MIT,
Stanford, and other top universities joined mathemat-
ics educators and other professors of education in an
attempt “to express their tentative views upon the
shape and content of a pre-college mathematics cur-
riculum that might be brought into being over the next
few decades.” [p. iii]
These mathematicians were strongly affected by the
modernization of mathematics that was the trademark
of UICSM, SMSG, and the other new math projects,
and the successes that the projects seemed to be hav-
ing. It led them to believe that students could learn
much more if the mathematics were presented in an
abstract, clear, and logical way. So they proposed a
curriculum for grades K-6 that included conic sections,
equations of lines, 3-dimensional Cartesian coordi-
nates, polar coordinates, the vocabulary of elemen-
tary logic, graphs of relations and functions, the loga-
rithm function and trigonometric functions. This was
before the appearance of handheld calculators, but the
use of desk calculators, slide rules, and tables was
encouraged at these grades. In grades 7 and 8, stu-
dents would study rational forms and functions, the
derivative of a polynomial, the Euclidean algorithm,
and a huge amount of statistics, including expecta-
tion and variance and the Poisson distribution. Two
curricular organizations were proposed for grades 7-
12 for the following reasons: First, as the authors
wrote, “It was recognized that there are many differ-
ent routes to follow in teaching geometry and that each
has its advantages.” [p. 47] Second, the authors be-
lieved that more than one approach to algebra and to
calculus seemed reasonable, and they admitted not
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to know which was best. In both proposed curricula,
probability and linear algebra were to be studied more
than once.
Although their suggestions remain extraordinarily
unrealistic, the Cambridge Conference mathemati-
cians recognized the role they were playing: “These
views are intended to serve as a basis for widespread
further discussion and, above all, experimentation by
mathematicians, teachers, and all others who share
the responsibility for the processes and goals of Ameri-
can education. At this stage of their development they
can not pretend to represent guidelines for school
administrators or mathematics teachers, and they
should not be read as such.” [p. iii]
The Cambridge Conference mathematicians recog-
nized that the difference between a mathematician and
a mathematics educator is as great as that between a
research biologist and a practicing physician. The
physician sees patients and knows both symptoms
and potential cures. The good physician realizes that
not all patients are alike, and that you can prescribe
things but patients don’t always do what you pre-
scribe. Mathematics teachers and those who train
them and deal with curriculum day in and day out
are the physicians of our profession. Teachers are the
experts, and are particularly expert about their com-
munity.
In these years, mathematics educators loved the new
math, and the general public liked it as well. In 1966,
Francis Mueller, after studying articles about math-
ematics education in popular magazines from 1956 to
1965, identified those years as “happy years for ‘new
math”’ and concluded, “As these years pass, less and
less is said about mathematics being a highly disliked
subject; more and more is said about the brightness
of the future along these new mathematical tracts.”
But Mueller noted that at the beginning of 1965 there
began to appear articles in Time and Newsweek ques-
tioning the ideas behind the new math. He wondered
whether these articles might “mark a point of transi-
tion at which the public began to revise its perception
of ‘new math’.” [Francis Mueller, “The Public Image
of New Mathematics,” Mathematics Teacher 59 (No-
vember 1966): 621.] We know today that the public
did revise its perception—completely. New math is
now often treated as a debacle in mathematics educa-
tion.
What is not so well-known is that the evidence for a
debacle is not there. If the new math was so bad, how
come the evidence is so hard to find? In fact, the evi-
dence often leads the other way. By the early 1970s
we were producing more students majoring in math-
ematics and majoring in science than ever before.
Advanced placement programs existed in many
schools where fifteen years before there was no math-
ematics beyond trigonometry. Enrollments were up
in all mathematics courses even though many states
had not changed their graduation requirements.
The public was misled by false signs of failure and a
lack of sophistication about statistics that made it im-
possible to read these signs accurately. The first false
sign of failure was a 21-point drop in SAT scores from
1963 to 1973. Although everyone should have real-
ized immediately that something outside of math-
ematics was affecting performance when the verbal
scores dropped 35 points in the same time period, not
until 1976 did an official College Board report indi-
cate that the drop in the 1960s was due to the much
larger numbers of students taking the test.
The second false sign of failure was the appearance in
1972 of the first National Assessment of Educational
Progress data on how well our 13-year-olds and 17-
year-olds performed. As virtually always happens in
the first administration of every large-scale test, per-
formance was lower than people expected. But the
NAEP designers were not so naïve. They also pur-
posely tested adults who had gone to school before
new math and found that the 17-year-olds outper-
formed those adults. This result, however, had no ef-
fect on the public view.
There was a true sign of failure. Although, overall,
students seemed to be helped by new math, many stu-
dents—particularly slower ones—were not well
served by an abstract mathematics curriculum. These
students were blown away by the new math, and their
parents commiserated with them. Teachers and other
adults who had been against the new math from the
beginning used every instance of failure of new math
students as a sign that the entire movement was a fail-
ure, and rallied public support against these curricula.
In the mid-1970s, as a response to the new math, a
back-to-basics textbook series for grades K-12 ap-
peared. It encouraged competence on skills without
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properties or applications, and the books contained
little or no explanation. For a couple of years the el-
ementary school texts of this series were the most
purchased in the country. Though the back-to-basics
high school texts were used in many places, well into
the 1980s the textbooks of the Dolciani series, written
in the 1960s and showing great influence of new math,
remained the most used books in the country for al-
gebra and geometry students. Honors algebra and
geometry classes and the more advanced courses in
the best schools continued to teach a curriculum very
much like the new math curricula of the 1960s.
Concurrent with the back-to-basics movement came
a movement for minimum competence, and these two
movements together had the effect of encouraging
teachers to teach algebraic skills without understand-
ing and to lessen attention to proof in geometry. There
was also a positive effect: Books were cleansed of the
excesses of the new math. For instance, the ubiqui-
tous first chapter on sets that had little relation to the
rest of the book was taken out, as were overzealous
formalisms and explanations that were at too high a
level for student understanding.
Most parents of today’s students took the courses in
the 1970s that their children are being taught now. So
the experience of the parents of current students is
likely to have been at the time when new math was
being branded a failure and back-to-basics curricula
were being touted.
It is difficult to find any value in the back-to-basics
backlash other than the cleansing of the excesses of
new math. Within a few years following the backlash,
scores on the SATs were the lowest they have ever
been. That situation prompted quite a number of re-
ports in the late 1970s and early 1980s encouraging
improvement in mathematics education. Some of
these reports promoted problem-solving rather than
skill development as the key goal of school mathemat-
ics. Others promoted a rethinking of the high school
curriculum with continued attention to algebra, ge-
ometry and functions, but stronger attention to ap-
plications, to probability and statistics, and to the
widespread use of calculators and computers and the
mathematics related to them. Mathematicians and
mathematics educators worked together on these re-
ports. They were, for the most part, not the same
people who had led the new math movement of 25
years earlier. The mathematicians included applied
mathematicians, computer scientists, and statisticians.
The mathematics educators included big city and state
supervisors. The most well-known of these reports
was A Nation at Risk, which appeared in 1983.
THE CURRENT ERA
The situation since 1983 has been strikingly parallel
to that of the new math era. The first of the reform
projects was UCSMP. Six years later the major cata-
lyst for more reform appeared in the form of the
NCTM Curriculum and Evaluation Standards for School
Mathematics. Within a couple of years, the govern-
ment—specifically, the National Science Foundation—
poured massive amounts of money into curriculum
reform. These events followed almost exactly the
schedule of the development of the new math 32 years
earlier, as Table 1 indicates.
Again there was euphoria. State after state adopted
its own version of the Standards. NSF felt so good
about its projects that it assumed they would be suc-
cessful and planned for dissemination well before any
data were collected. And there are statistics to back
up these good feelings about the current era. During
Table I
Parallel Developments in New Math Era
and Current Era
First project: year n
Catalyst for more
projects: year n+6
Government help
years n+7 on
Sign of euphoria
year n+11
False signs of failure
years n+14, n+21
True sign of failure
Current Era
1983-
UCSMP
NCTM
Standards
NSF curricula
States follow
NCTM
TIMSS
not known
New Math Era
1951-1973
UICSM
Sputnik
NDEA
Cambridge
Conference
SAT decline,
NAEP
Poorer
students lost
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the 1990s, more students have taken more mathemat-
ics in high school than ever before. Until a decline of
a single point this year, in every year of the 1990s SAT
scores have stayed the same or increased from the
previous year. ACT scores have also either increased
or stayed the same for each year in the decade. Mean
scores on the long-term trend data of the National
Assessment of Educational progress have increased.
It has been a decade of phenomenal growth.
However, again there is a false sign of failure. This
time it is the misinterpretation of the results from the
Third Intenational Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS). The TIMSS re-
searchers did not compare
performance of our students
now with the performance
of our students on FIMS
(First International Math-
ematics Study, 1964) or
SIMS (Second International
Mathematics Study, 1981). If
they had, the headlines would have been different,
because U.S. students seem to have performed quite
a bit better comparatively on TIMSS than on the pre-
vious studies.
Specifically, the U.S. is being compared to Singapore,
which scored even higher than Japan at the 4th and
8th grade levels. (Singapore did not participate at the
12th grade level.) But I will argue that the U.S. per-
forms strikingly well, even compared to Singapore.
My argument has to do with economics, sociology and
geography.
First, the economics and the sociology. Throughout
the world, both FIMS and SIMS showed that perfor-
mance within a country was higher in those places
within the country that were more affluent. The one
exception to this was Japan, where performance was
quite uniform throughout the country.
It is well-known that performance within the U.S. fits
the international pattern. That is, throughout our
country the best performing students in general are
found in our affluent suburbs and the lowest-perform-
ing students are found in our poorest rural and urban
areas. In our affluent suburbs, the students do score
as well as the students from Singapore. Our evidence
for this comes from the performance of students in
the First in the World Consortium outside Chicago
on TIMSS. I am reasonably certain that performance
would be matched in similarly affluent places else-
where in the country where the schools can select their
own curriculum and are not subject to state con-
straints. Just this week, Gerald Bracey, a writer for Phi
Delta Kappan on the interpretation of educational re-
search, has reported that such a study has been done
of the data from TIMSS and that it shows our subur-
ban areas would be second in the world. If true, it
would indicate that these students score as high de-
spite many of the students not having a curriculum
that is as advanced as that of Singapore. It would thus
show that our suburban
students learn better what
they are taught than stu-
dents from Singapore.
Now for the economics and
the geographic part of the
argument. Singapore is an
independent country, but
viewed from a larger geographic perspective it is the
most affluent area of southeast Asia. Its per capita
gross national product is five times higher than that
of Malaysia which surrounds it and is only surpassed
by the very small country of Brunei. Singapore’s per
capita GNP is higher than that of Spain or Hong Kong
or New Zealand. As with our suburbs, in recent gen-
erations people migrated to Singapore from neighbor-
ing areas, mostly China, because they wanted a bet-
ter life. Today over three-fourths of the population of
Singapore is Chinese even though Singapore does not
lie close to China. The population of Singapore is spe-
cial for the same reason that the population of our
suburbs is special. And for these reasons the perfor-
mance is similar.
There is no question we can do better than we have
been doing. The disparities are tragic between per-
formance in some states and others, and between per-
formance in our suburbs and our cities, even though,
ostensibly, we do not teach different mathematics in
these different places. The performance in our more
affluent areas demonstrates that we can improve what
we are doing without major changes in curricula, but
it also suggests that we might have to change eco-
nomic opportunity in order to do so. We still have
huge numbers of mathematics teachers who do not
know enough about the subject to teach it well. These
❝The disparities are tragic...even though, ostensi-
bly, we do not teach different mathematics in
these different places.
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teachers have trouble handling a curriculum like
UCSMP’s which wants students to have more than
one way of doing a problem and asks students to ap-
ply mathematics and make connections.
But is there a sign that we are doing worse than we
have done in the recent past? I don’t know of a single
national study in which such a signal is found. Fur-
thermore, states such as North Carolina and Texas and
Michigan, whose National Assessment results have
increased the most of any states in the country, are
those who claim to have implemented the current
kinds of reforms. Nevertheless, there are those who
claim that the present reforms are a failure.
BELIEFS OF THE ANTI-REFORMERS
While a great number of mathematicians support the
reforms in K-12 mathematics education, another
group opposes these reforms. The anti-reform math-
ematicians are from the same types of outstanding
universities as the mathematicians of the Cambridge
Conference. For the most part, they are research math-
ematicians. Some are quite eminent. We cannot ex-
pect their knowledge of mathematics education and
of students in schools to be any greater than that of
the mathematicians in the Cambridge Conference. But,
unlike the Cambridge Conference mathematicians,
who took their role to be provokers and were careful
to say that their ideas needed to be tested, these math-
ematicians desire to directly affect mathematics edu-
cation.
In one state of the union they have taken over, and
from this state we can obtain a picture of the solution
these mathematicians offer. Their solution is found in
the Mathematics Framework for California Public Schools.
The catalyst for the Mathematics Framework for Califor-
nia Public Schools was California’s poor performance
on the 1996 National Assessment of Educational
Progress. California scored 3rd lowest of the 44 states
that participated in this assessment test. Its mean scale
score of 138 was 10 points, or approximately one full
grade level, behind the national norm of 148. But this
disguises the differences among the performance of
various subgroups. White students in California were
only 3 points below the national mean for white stu-
dents. Asian students scored only 2 points below the
national mean for Asian students. Black students
scored 1 point above the national mean for Black Stu-
dents. But Hispanic students, constituting 39% of the
student population, scored 27 points behind the total
national norm and 6 points behind the national mean
for Hispanic students, and they caused the state’s
overall mean to be so low compared to the nation.
[Science and Engineering Indicators, p. A-12]
With such diversity, it would seem reasonable to leave
decisions to local school districts about what math-
ematics should be taught. But there is a history in
California of strong control from the state’s Depart-
ment of Education in Sacramento. For grades K-8 the
state approves books, and the approved books must
follow the state framework. Mathematics Framework for
California Public Schools, therefore, is not just a theo-
retical document; it has teeth.
Twenty-four individuals are listed as having contrib-
uted to the present Mathematics Framework. Not one
of these individuals is a university mathematics edu-
cator, and all the sample problems were developed
by university mathematics professors.
The tone of the document reflects the excesses rather
than the lessons of the new math. Here is the intro-
duction to one of those problems [p. 154]: “Starting
with grade eight, students should be ready for the
basic message that logical reasoning is the underpin-
ning of all mathematics...Students should begin to
learn to prove every statement they make. Every text-
book or mathematics lesson should try to convey this
message and to convey it well. Consider the problem
of solving this equation:
x - 
1
4
(3x - 1)= 2x - 5
Multiply both sides by 4 to get:
4x - (3x - 1) = 8x - 20
Then simplify the left side to get:
x + 1 = 8x - 20
Transposing x from left to right yields:
1 = 7x - 20
One more transposition gives the result x = 3.
So far this seems to be an entirely mechanical proce-
dure. No proof is involved.”
No proof is involved? It looks very much like a proof
to me, except that I would emphasize doing the same
things to both sides of the equation and avoid words
like “transposing” that suggest to students that math-
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ematics is a bag of tricks. If you showed that 3 is in-
deed a solution to the first equation, then I would ar-
gue that this is a proof that x - 
1
4
(3x - 1) = 2x - 5 <=> x
= 3. But this does not constitute a proof for the Math-
ematics Framework writers. Their proof can be found
at the top of the next page. It is, in my opinion, cruel
and unusual punishment to inflict this kind of ped-
antry onto young children.
Under the criterion for proof used by the Mathemat-
ics Framework writers, virtually every argument la-
beled a “proof” in any college textbook or any article
on mathematics would be disqualified. So we now
have a new criterion for a written proof. It must be
rigorous. But even the presented proof is not rigor-
ous. A couple of reasons are missing in step 15. And
where are the logical principles such as modus ponens
and the transitivity of implication?
The authors of this example have confused rigor and
proof. They have confused logic and proof. And in
the process they have repeated one of the major ex-
cesses of the new math era: the overemphasis on rigor.
There is a significant marginal comment on this page.
“Without the realization that a mathematical proof is
lurking behind the well-known formalism of solving
linear equations, a teacher would most likely empha-
size the wrong points in the presentation of begin-
ning algebra.” I agree with the point that students
should learn that solving an equation proves a state-
ment. But this is not the time to learn that. The au-
thors have made a natural but fundamental error
about teaching young students. Every teacher learns
through experience that students learn in different
ways and that a multitude of explanations are needed,
ranging from the formal to the intuitive, from the sym-
bolic to the pictorial.
Because the countries that scored highest on TIMSS
tend not to use calculators in early grades, the authors
of this framework conclude that calculators cause our
students to perform poorly. Having asserted that cor-
  1.  x - 
1
4
(3x - 1) = 2x - 5
  2. 4(x - 
1
4
(3x - 1)) = 4(2x - 5)
  3. 4x - 4(
1
4
(3x - 1)) = 4(2x) - 20
  4. 4x - (4 • 
1
4
)(3x - 1) = (4 • 2)x - 20
  5. 4x - (3x - 1) = 8x - 20
  6. 4x + (-3x + 1) = 8x - 20
  7. (4x + (-3x)) + 1 = 8x - 20
  8. x + 1 = 8x - 20
  9. -x + (x + 10) = (-x + 8x) - 20
10. (-x + x) + 1 = (-x + 8x) - 20
11. 1 = 7x - 20
12. 1 + 20 = (7x - 20)+ 20
13. 21 = 7x + [(-20) + 20]
14. 21 = 7x
15. 3 = x
16. x = 3
  1. Hypothesis
  2. a = b implies ca = cb for all numbers a, b, c.
  3. Distributive law
  4. Associative law for multiplication
  5. 1 • a = a for all numbers a
  6. -(a - b) = (-a + b) for all numbers a, b.
  7. Associative law for addition
  8. 4x + (-3x) = (4 + (-3)) x, by the distributive
law
  9. Equals added to equals are equal.
10. Associative law for addition: 0 + 1 = 1.
11. -x + 8x - (-1 + 8)x, by the distributive law
12. Equals added to equals are equal.
13. Associative law for addition
14. -a + a = 0 for all a; b + 0 = b for all b.
15. Multiply (14) by 
1
7  and apply the
 associative law to 
1
7 (7x).
16. a = b implies that b = a Q.E.D.
Recommended Proof of x - 1
4
(3x - 1) = 2x - 5 by the writers of the Mathematics Framework
Mathematics Framework for California Public Schools, p. 155
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relation does not imply causation, they reason as if it
does. The assessment program that goes along with
this framework does not allow the use of calculators
from kindergarten to grade 11. The authors ignore the
fact that Singapore, Japan, and China, in their newer
elementary curricula, are introducing calculators be-
cause they have come to realize the necessity of their
students being technologically facile with mathemat-
ics. If you are interested in reading about these inter-
national developments, examine the proceedings from
UCSMP’s Fourth International Conference on Math-
ematics Education held in the summer of 1998 and
now available in Developments in School Mathematics
Education Around the World, Volume 4 from NCTM.
There are a number of applications presented in the
California Framework, particularly in the sample prob-
lems. Statistics has a strong presence. But modeling,
as essential to applied mathematics as proof is to pure
mathematics, is completely absent. The student will
leave high school not realizing that mathematics is
applicable outside of money matters, statistics, and
the physical sciences.
With the exception of statistics, the Mathematics Frame-
work ignores virtually all of the developments in the
mathematical sciences in the past 50 years. The au-
thors have created a curriculum that asserts what was
good for students 30-40 years ago is still what’s good
for students today. And they have not taken into ac-
count that such a curriculum destroyed students at
the bottom end.
CONCERNS AT THE COLLEGE LEVEL
Anti-reform mathematicians appear to be motivated
by three major concerns. A first concern is that, at the
top end, we are not creating enough students with
high mathematical competence. This includes the con-
cern that we are not creating enough well-trained
mathematics teachers. A second concern is that too
many students enter college needing to take remedial
mathematics courses because they lack sufficient pa-
per-and-pencil manipulative algebraic skills. The third
concern is the decreasing emphasis on proof in sec-
ondary school mathematics courses.
The third concern, that proof is disappearing from
high school mathematics, is one that we in UCSMP
feel is a valid concern. We have tried to incorporate
proof into four of our courses, with strong attention
in both Geometry and PDM.
Most of my data about the first concern, students at
the top end, come from the National Science Board
report entitled Science & Engineering Indicators for 1998.
This means that the data go no further than 1996. Let
us begin with AP calculus.
ADVANCED PLACEMENT STUDENTS
In 1994 7% of all high school graduates took an AP
calculus course, compared with 4% in 1990, 3% in 1987,
and 1.5% in 1982. Almost half of these students are
female. [Science & Engineering Indicators, 1998, p. A-
16] This enormous increase is due in part to increas-
ing numbers of students taking algebra in eighth
grade, a trend in which UCSMP has had a hand. Even
the birth of AP statistics has not lowered the numbers
of students taking AP calculus.
PERCENT OF STUDENTS INTENDING TO MAJOR IN SCIENCE OR ENGINEERING
I could not find data for all students, so these data are
limited to white students only. In 1996 32.2% of white
freshmen intended to major in science and engineer-
ing. This is the highest percent in the last twenty years.
Of these, 11.6% planned to major in the natural sci-
ences. That is lower than the 12.0% of 1995 and the
11.9% of 1994, but higher than every other year since
1976.
The percent of white freshmen planning to major in
mathematics or computer science peaked in 1982 at
5.9% but by 1985 had gone down to 2.5% and by 1992
was 2.2%. Since 1992 there has been a reasonably
steady rise in this percent. In 1996 2.7% of freshmen
planned to major in mathematics or computer science,
the highest percent since 1985. [p. A-57]
Table 2
Bachelor’s Degrees in Mathematics and Computer
Science Awarded in the US Between 1975 & 1995
1995:
1987:
1986:
1981:
1975:
Mathematics
13,851
16,515 (relative max.)
16,388
11,901 (relative min.)
18,346
Computer Science
24,769
39,927
42,195 (max.)
15,233
5,039
From Science & Engineering Indicators 1998, p. A-64.
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The net result is that more students are now coming
into college with high-end mathematics and with a
broad desire to major in science or engineering, and a
specific desire to major in mathematics or computer
science, than in the 1980s before the current reforms.
Whether this is due to economics or to curriculum, I
do not know.
Now let us ask what happens to these students.
NUMBER OF BACHELOR’S DEGREES
The number of bachelor’s degrees in mathematics has
seesawed. It was 18,346 in 1975, a year in which most
students would have had their high school education
in new math-oriented curricula. From 1979-1984, years
in which students would have had their high school
education affected by back-to-basics, it went down to
around 12,500. Since 1985, its peak was in 1987 and
there has been a steady decline to the 1995 level of
13,851, which is about 20% below the 1987 level. (See
Table 2.) This is a serious problem, because we need
more mathematics majors, but it will have been solved
by this year if the degree-intending students of 1996
get degrees in mathematics proportional to their num-
bers in prior years.
Even more surprising is a much more serious decline
in the number of bachelor’s degrees in computer sci-
ence than the decline in mathematics. There were over
42,000 computer science degrees in 1986 but under
25,000 in 1995. (See Table 2.)
FOREIGN CITIZENS
There has been a reasonably steady increase in the
percent of bachelor’s degrees in mathematics or com-
puter science given to foreign citizens, from 5% in 1985
to 7% in 1995. [p. A-67] It is very difficult to see how
this is related to changes in the U.S. curriculum. It
seems far more related to the easing of world tensions
early in this decade, to the increase in the study of
English worldwide as a second language, and to the
increased desire for a college education by people in
countries where college attendance is not as accessible
as in the U.S.
GRADUATE ENROLLMENT
Graduate enrollment in mathematics and computer
science is double what it was in 1975 and has fluctu-
ated in a narrow range since 1987. The percent of for-
eign nationals has also fluctuated, between 26% and
33% since 1983, peaking in 1991. It is currently at 32%.
[pp. A-70, A-72] Graduate enrollment has to lag quite
a bit behind school curriculum changes, so these data
are not influenced by the current reform movements.
DOCTORAL DEGREES
The number of doctorates in mathematics in 1995 was
1,190, the highest it has been since 1975 and 72% higher
than its low value in 1985. The number of doctorates
in computer science in 1995 was the highest it has ever
been. While the total number of doctorates in math-
ematics and computer science granted to temporary
residents of the U.S. has more than doubled since 1977,
the number of doctorates granted to U.S. citizens has
also increased significantly. [p. A-82]
These data do not suggest a crisis, and certainly not
anything attributable to recent curricula.
Now let us consider the second concern—that stu-
dents are more poorly trained than they used to be. I
do not have long-term data on this, but 13% of all
physical science and 14% of all engineering freshman
majors in 1995 reported a need for remedial work in
mathematics. This figure varies markedly with
ethnicity: 11% of whites but over 30% of Blacks. In
other words, 1 out of 9 white students and 1 out of 3
Black students majoring in the physical sciences or
engineering reported a need for remedial work in
mathematics. (See Table 3.)
Table 3
Freshmen Reporting Need for Remedial Work in
Mathematics in 1995
By major and gender
Physical science:
Engineering:
Social science:
non-science or eng:
By major and ethnicity
Physical science:
Engineering:
Social science:
non-science or eng:
All
13.0%
14.3%
27.5%
25.0%
White
11.1%
10.3%
24.2%
22.0%
Male
11.3%
13.9%
20.2%
20.8%
Black
39.9%
31.1%
47.5%
47.1%
Female
15.5%
15.5%
32.2%
28.0%
Hispanic
20.7%
34.1%
41.2%
37.0%
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Significantly more freshman majoring in social science
need remedial work in mathematics: 20% of males and
32% of females; 24% of whites and 48% of Blacks.
These high percentages seem to reflect the ancient
view that if you are going to major in the social sci-
ences, you don’t need to take as much mathematics
in high school. These students, generally not as profi-
cient, will not be helped by a more theoretical math-
ematics curriculum.
I assume that these percents are higher today than they
used to be. And so we must ask: if scores of high school
students are going up, why
are the percents of students
needing remediation not
going down?
The reasons are many. First,
despite revolutions in ap-
plied mathematics and in
the ways in which comput-
ers change how mathemat-
ics can be done, the mathematics departments of
many, if not most, major universities have not changed
their basic required curriculum in a generation. And,
because they haven’t changed their curricula, they
haven’t changed their tests to represent what students
are taught in high school. So the students do not score
as well as they used to score (though, frankly, I have
yet to see a published study on college placement tests
over time). Mathematics departments need to wake
up and recognize statistics, computer science, and
applied mathematics as topics that are as important
for mathematics majors as algebra and analysis, and
test incoming students on their knowledge of basic
ideas from these areas. Placement exams need to rec-
ognize that computers are here to stay, and allow stu-
dents to use calculators on the tests because they will
have such calculators with them their entire lives.
A second reason for more remediation is that college
mathematics requirements have increased. Fields that
used to require very little mathematics—psychology,
business, the biological sciences, and the social sci-
ences—now require statistics or calculus and some-
times linear algebra and finite mathematics. Many
institutions now require some mathematics of all their
students. In this regard, high school counselors are
often behind the times. And, consequently, some stu-
dents come to college without having taken the math-
ematics they should have taken to major in these fields.
And, when they have taken the mathematics, they
thought that it was just to fulfill an entrance require-
ment and did not realize that they would have to dem-
onstrate competence.
Third, high schools are doing a better job of interest-
ing their students in mathematics, and so some stu-
dents who are not the very best students still like the
subject, and they want to major in it even though they
will not be research mathematicians. They may not
be as good as most mathematics students were in the
past, but they are as inter-
ested, and we need them
because we have a chronic
shortage of mathematics
teachers.
Mathematics departments
in many institutions oper-
ate as if computers and cal-
culators do not exist, have
requirements that suggest that applications of math-
ematics are for the not-so-serious student, still think
that writing logically-correct mathematics legibly is
sufficient to be called good teaching. No wonder that
they are losing students to statistics, to economics, to
operations research, to business and to many other
disciplines which yearn for students who like and are
proficient at mathematics. Who wants to major in an
area that ignores even major changes within it?
Some people have argued that baseball players are
not as good today as they were fifty years ago. Fifty
years ago if you wished to be a professional athlete,
you had little choice but to go into baseball. So base-
ball got the best athletes. There may be an analogy
with mathematics. Fifty years ago if you liked pure
mathematics, your choice was limited to mathemat-
ics. But today, you can go into many disciplines where
your talents will be utilized.
A fourth reason for the poor performance of incom-
ing college freshmen on placement tests is that place-
ment tests are often given under conditions that do
not allow students to show off what they know. A test
given to students who have just come to campus a
few days before, who are concerned about their new
roommates, about the medical exam they just had,
about their new ID card, not to mention being away
❝They may not be as good as most mathematics
students were in the past, but they are as inter-
ested, and we need them because we have a
chronic shortage of mathematics teachers.
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from home, and who may have stayed up quite late
talking to others in their dorms, is not being taken
under optimal conditions. Also, students have had
different courses in high school and need to be in-
formed in advance exactly what topics are going to
be on the test, and the kinds of language and notation
that are going to be used.
REASONS FOR DISAGREEMENT
Why do people come to different conclusions about
what is happening? Why does a U.S. Department of
Education panel’s choice of the best mathematics
materials in the country for grades K-8 have nothing
in common with the books selected earlier this year
in California, except for UCSMP Transition Mathemat-
ics and Algebra?
We who are in the field are privy to much informa-
tion about what is going on. We may be aware of the
politics on both sides. But what are parents and the
public to think? When there are conflicting views
about an issue, and there seems to be no overwhelm-
ing authority, the tendency is to believe the loudest or
the boldest. The press does not help; they revel in
publicizing conflicts and tend to select individuals
with extreme positions to make the point that there is
a conflict.
We who are in mathematics must fight this tendency,
regardless of how we feel about the issues. Truth in
our field is based on careful reasoning. If we are in
pure mathematics, we reason from assumptions us-
ing logical deduction. If we are in applied mathemat-
ics, we analyze data using statistical principles. In
neither case should we allow untested opinion to sway
us. In those cases where we do not have enough evi-
dence to make a conclusion, we should be willing to
say that a problem is unsolved. If we come to differ-
ent conclusions, we ought to try to apply the tools of
mathematics to determine why.
I don’t think the critics of current reforms are operat-
ing with the same assumptions that we have, and I
would like to finish by asserting some of the assump-
tions under which we operate at UCSMP. We in
schools must educate everyone, and we cannot as-
sume our students are motivated by the same things
that motivate university-level mathematicians. As the
NCTM Professional Teaching Standards emphasize,
teaching is a complicated process, not subject to simple
prescriptions. In some cases logical approaches work,
but for many topics a good application or a game or
an activity works better, and representations can be
particularly powerful. Capable mathematics teachers
who teach students every day contributed to the
NCTM Standards and the newer curricula. They are
not ignorant of mathematics. We want our students
to have the same appreciation for its beauty, its logi-
cal structure, and its applications that we have. We
try to instill in our students an appreciation also for
careful reasoning, for not assuming a conclusion with-
out weighing all, of the evidence. Statistics and math-
ematical modeling help our students to weigh data,
to recognize the importance of comparable samples
when comparing groups, to realize that there may be
more than one answer to a real problem. We teach the
students of today for what they need tomorrow, not
for what they needed yesterday, and we realize that
to avoid the use of technology is to doom our stu-
dents to ignorance of much of the world of mathemat-
ics. We recognize that mathematics is important in
consumer affairs, in matters of public policy, and in
business as well as in its traditional venues of science
and engineering and a subject to study for its own
sake. It is because mathematics is more important than
ever that we must work to see that all students are
not only taught a significant amount of mathematics,
but that they learn it.
“Try not to become a man of success but rather to become
a man of value.”
--Albert Einstein
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As any mathematician who has worked widely in
applied statistics knows firsthand, it is true in the so-
cial sciences no less than the natural sciences that new
discoveries often begin with the availability of new
kinds of data. And such data, in the social sciences, in
turn often owe their existence to novel ways of har-
nessing, to the purposes of science, technology for
recording human behavior. Virtually whole new fields
of study may be born in this way: a piquant example
is the field of child language acquisition, which bur-
geoned with the availability of portable audiotape
recorders in the 1970s.
The Teaching Gap is based on novel, indeed unique,
data of high quality and unprecedented scope: a ran-
dom sample, statistically controlled to minimize bias,
of eighth-grade mathematics classroom lessons in the
U.S., recorded on videotape, and corresponding in-
formation from Japan and from Germany—three na-
tional video samples, representative of teaching in
each country. The video study “is the first to collect
videotaped records of classroom instruction—in any
subject—from national probability samples.”1
This video study is actually one component of the
Third International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS), itself as a whole a much more advanced
study methodologically than its like-named predeces-
sors. “Fortunately, the TIMSS sampling plan was
highly sophisticated...the video sample [was] a ran-
dom subsample of the full TIMSS sample. Not only
were specific teachers selected, but specific class peri-
ods as well. No substitutions were allowed...”2  It is
evident that substantial efforts were made in the video
study (and in TIMSS as a whole) to minimize both
sampling and nonsampling errors.
The last quote is from an excellent overview article
on the video study, written by the authors of The Teach-
ing Gap, and available on the Web.3  The authors main-
tain a Web site4  with links to articles, including this
one, that are related to The Teaching Gap, the video
study, and TIMSS. One of the links (still under con-
struction as of this writing) from this site will allow
the viewing of some of the actual videos.
The decision by the National Center for Education
Statistics to collect national videotape samples reflects
the early influence5  of one of the authors of The Teach-
ing Gap, James W. Stigler, who was a co-author of an
earlier highly regarded study6  comparing Japanese
and Chinese education to our own. Stigler realized
that the problem of a lack of common understanding
of basic terms to describe teaching, all the more seri-
ous in an international context, would require data
more raw, less filtered, than questionnaire responses
could offer.7
Based on these video data, the authors set out to ad-
dress fundamental questions about mathematics
teaching as it is actually and typically done, in the
three countries: What methods do teachers use to
teach? Does mathematics teaching differ in any sig-
nificant ways from one country to another, or are
teachers in all three cultures teaching mathematics
more or less the same way? And, in the U.S., are
high-profile reform recommendations actually being
put into practice? Also, because the video data would
show actual classroom teaching as it is, unmediated
by measurement instruments such as questionnaires,
such data would have the power to surprise and to
reveal the unexpected.
And surprise they did: “To put it simply, we were
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amazed at how much teaching varied across cultures
and how little it varied within cultures.”8  This core
finding of the book, stated here in formal language
reminiscent of a statistical analysis of variance, ought
to cause a double-take: what is being said here seems
important and fundamental, even stunning. With the
authors’ meticulous support, both qualitative and
quantitative, this finding gives an empirical basis in
the case of mathematics teaching to the claim which
forms the title of the pivotal
and most profound chapter
in the book (Chapter 6):
“Teaching is a Cultural Ac-
tivity.”
And this finding, with the
evidence for it, is the central
reason this review is being
offered in a journal on hu-
manistic mathematics, one essential concern of which
we take to be how the expression of mathematical ac-
tivity is shaped by its cultural backdrop.
Of course this empirical basis extends only to the
teaching of mathematics, since all the data in the video
study are from mathematics classes. To those of us
whose main concern is the teaching of mathematics
anyway, this is not of great consequence. But it is an
inferential lapse, that mars the book’s otherwise care-
ful methodological presentation, to claim (as the au-
thors implicitly do throughout the analysis of the
video study) that the “points we make go well be-
yond mathematics” and thereby to extrapolate a con-
clusion well beyond the scope of the data. Seeing the
authors’ findings, one is certainly inclined to hypoth-
esize that teaching in general is similarly culturally
conditioned, but the authors present no proof of that
general proposition.
A related extrapolative claim that the authors make is
indirectly better supported, however, namely that the
points they make extend “certainly well beyond eighth
grade.” Indeed, there are enough commonalities even
with our own experiences at the college level, as we
suggest below and in Part II, to make this claim per-
suasive.
It is widely known that American educational achieve-
ment (not only) in mathematics does not stack up well
in international comparisons; e.g., TIMSS showed this,
and did so even more authoritatively than did its two
antecedent international studies. Nor is it any secret
that wave after wave of efforts to reform American
education (not only) in mathematics has failed to re-
sult in improved student performance.
For this dismal record the authors have a simple yet
profound core explanation, one that reverberates like
a theorem understood for the first time, feeling like
something we have known
liminally all along: in our
efforts to reform American
education, “We have been
acting as if teaching is a
noncultural activity.” But
teaching is a culture-bound
activity, and this “explains
why teaching has been so
resistant to change,” and
our not taking that fundamentally into account is why
we have failed. (Again, as noted above, the authors
overreach their empirical base, which is only in math-
ematics teaching, but the reader is inclined to go
along.)
Taking this fundamentally into account is also why
the Japanese, in particular, have succeeded: “In Japan,
by contrast, teaching practices appear to have changed
markedly over the past fifty years.”  And Japanese
students, correspondingly, now perform among the
top internationally. The authors look, for a model, to
the Japanese system for the improvement of teaching
not only for these reasons but also, and crucially, be-
cause “Japan’s system of improvement ... is built on
the idea that teaching is a complex, cultural activity.”
The Teaching Gap’s analysis and interpretation of the
video data work up to the chapter mentioned above,
entitled “Teaching is a Cultural Activity,” and sub-
stantiate this claim. This analysis is concerned with
the details of what actually goes on in classrooms and
characterizes teaching in the three countries, show-
ing both qualitatively and quantitatively the stark in-
feriorities of U.S. mathematics teaching (not teachers)
to the other countries’, especially Japan’s. This mate-
rial can raise our awareness of features of our teach-
ing that we might well have been taking for granted,
and offer fertile images of alternatives.
The authors follow this analysis by proposing a
❝Teaching is a culture-bound activity, and this
“explains why teaching has been so resistant to
change,” and our not taking that fundamentally
into account is why we have failed.
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mechanism for slow, organic change of our teaching
methods, based on the system in Japan whereby teach-
ers, acting as researchers, seek to improve classroom
teaching, lesson by lesson. This proposal speaks to our
concerns for the preparation of our future students,
as well as our sense of responsibility for the improve-
ment of mathematics education in the public schools.
What then does teaching look like in the U.S., Japan,
and Germany? To show this qualitatively and as an
image, the authors synthesize the video data into a
single typical pattern for each country’s mathematics
lesson. We focus on the U.S. and Japanese patterns,
since these exhibit the most stark contrast.
Both the Japanese and U.S. lessons typically began
with a review of previous work. In the U.S. this was
followed by “presenting a few sample problems and
demonstrating how to solve them.” Then the students
practiced solving problems like those presented. Fi-
nally, there was checking and correcting some of the
students’ practice work (and assigning homework).
In Japan, the initial review was followed by the pre-
sentation of a new problem for the day’s lesson. Stu-
dents then worked on trying to solve the problem.
There followed a discussion of various methods of so-
lution that the students had come up with or that the
teacher showed them. The lesson ended with the
teacher emphasizing the main points.
Thus, while within-culture variation (such as differ-
ent ways to demonstrate a procedure) looked so large
when the authors watched only U.S. lessons, when
they “watched a Japanese lesson...we noticed that the
teacher presents a problem to the students without
first demonstrating how to solve the problem. We re-
alized that U.S. teachers almost never do this, and now
we saw that a feature we hardly noticed before is per-
haps one of the most important features of U.S. les-
sons—that the teacher almost always demonstrates a
procedure for solving problems before assigning them
to students.” Thus, while both systems have the pre-
sentation of a new problem, this activity in Japan is
preparation for students to develop solution proce-
dures, while in the U.S. it allows a procedure to be
demonstrated and is followed by students practicing
the procedure.
This is, I think, the most critical single observation in
the book. I find it thought-provoking indeed to re-
flect on how this contrast may also fit our U.S. math-
ematics teaching at the college level.
The authors accordingly find the teaching of math-
ematics in the U.S. to be very constricted, “focused
for the most part on a very narrow band of procedural
skills.” Regardless of whether students are working
individually or in groups, or whether they are using
computers, American mathematics students “spend
most of their time acquiring isolated skills through re-
peated practice” [italics ours]. “Japanese teaching...
[shows] what it can look like to teach mathematics in
a deeper way, teaching for conceptual understanding.
Students in Japanese classrooms spend as much time
solving challenging problems and discussing math-
ematical concepts as they do practicing skills.”
To support these qualitative generalizations, the au-
thors characterize lessons in each country with statis-
tics on various salient features—“in research parlance,
‘indicators’—that might influence students’ learning.”
The U.S. lessons fall correspondingly short on these
quantitative summaries. The percent of U.S. vs. Japa-
nese lessons respectively exhibiting “concepts devel-
oped rather than [merely] stated” was 22% vs. 83%;
“medium [or] high quality of mathematical content”
(as opposed to low quality of content) was 11% or 0%
vs. 51% or 39%. The “average percentage of seatwork
time spent in ... apply[ing] [or] invent[ing]/think[ing]”
(as opposed to merely “practic[ing]” in familiar con-
texts) was 3.5% or 0.7% vs. 15% or 44%. The list goes
on.
Among its uses, this list can serve as a brief but salu-
tary cold shower for any of us at the college level who
may be entertaining misattributions as to what our
students’ preparations might be like. “[T]here were
no mathematics proofs in U.S. lessons. In contrast,
there were proofs in 53 percent of Japanese lessons...”
[italics theirs].
Probably more importantly, we can evaluate our own
teaching by the criteria in this list and reflect on how
the results of this evaluation might follow from the
critical observation contrasting U.S. and Japanese
teaching cited above.
Part II of this review of The Teaching Gap resumes with
a consideration of teaching as a tightly interconnected
system of features and the underlying cultural beliefs
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that vivify such a  system in the U.S. and in Japan.
There are some surprises here that have relevance to
college classrooms.
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Funny Problems
Florentin Smarandache
University of New Mexico
200 College Road
Gallup, NM 87301
A selection of original or collected recreational mathemati-
cal problems.
1) Prove that 2 = 1
Solution:
2 pints = 1 quart.
2) A man weighs the following weights on the fol-
lowing dates. How is this possible?
6/l/70 150 lbs.
6/3/70 0 lbs.
6/5/70 25 lbs.
6/7/70 0 lbs.
6/9/70 145 lbs.
Solution:
The man is an astronaut who went to the moon
and back.
Outerspace weightlessness: 0 lbs.
1
6 of Earth's gravity, or gravity of the moon: 25 lbs.
3) If you have a couple of threes and divide them in
half, why do you end up with 4 pieces?
Solution:
33 cut in half horizontally will make four pieces.
4) How 70 > 3 = LOVE?
Solution:
Move the characters of 70 > 3 around.
5) 10 - 1= 0
Solution:
If you have a stick (1) and an egg (0) and you give
away the stick (1) you still have the egg (0) left.
6) All monkeys eat bananas.
I eat bananas.
Therefore, I am a monkey!
7) Twelve minus one is equal to two.
Solution:
12 - 1 = 2 ( take digit 1 from 12).
8) 7 + 7 = 0.
Solution:
Take the sticks from the 7's and rearrange them to
form a rectangular zero 0.
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9) 3 x 2578 = hell
Solution:
Read your calculator upside down: 7734 (the prod-
uct of the numbers) becomes hell (approximately).
10) An earthworm is cut down the middle. How many
halves are there?
Solution:
One, because the other half can still be one whole
earthworm.
11) From two false hypotheses get a true statement.
Examples:
a) Grass is edible. (False)
Edible things are green. (False)
Therefore, grass is green. (True)
b) All dogs are poodles. (False)
Spot is a dog. (False)
Thus, Spot is a poodle. (True)
12) How can you add 3 with 3 and get 8?
Solution:
Turn one of the threes around and put them to-
gether to make an 8 (approximately).
13) If 10 trees fall down, and no one is around to hear
them falling, how many of the trees fall?
Solution: Ten.
14) When algebraically 1=0?
Solution:
In a null ring, which is a set with only one ele-
ment and one binary operation. If we take for "+"
and for the same operation, we get a commuta-
tive unitary ring.
In this case, the unitary element for "*" (which is
normally denoted by "1") and the null element,
(which is normally denoted by "0") coincide.
15) When is it possible to have: 1 + 1 = 10?
Solution: In base 2.
16) Another logic:
How can we have ten divided by two equal to
zero?
Solution:
Ten cookies divided by two kids are eaten and
nothing remains!
17) You are lost and walking down a road. You want
to get to town and know the road leads to town
but don't know which direction. You meet two
twin boys. You know one boy always tells the truth
and one always lies. The boys know the direction
to town. You cannot tell the boys apart and can
only ask one question to one boy to find the direc-
tion to town. What question should you ask?
Solution:
Ask either boy what the other boy would say is
the direction to town. This would be a lie because
if you were asking the dishonest boy he would
tell you a lie. If you were asking the honest boy he
would tell you the truth about what the dishonest
boy would say (which would be a lie) so he would
give you the wrong direction. Town would then
be in the opposite direction.
18) Why are manhole covers round? You know, the
manholes on the streets, is there a reason why they
made them round or could they be square or tri-
angular?
Solution:
Manhole covers are round because a circle cannot
fall inside of itself. If they were square, triangular
or some other shape they could be dropped into
the hole, which would be dangerous to traffic.
19) You have eleven lines. How can you move five
lines and still have nine?
Solution:
| | | | | | | | | | | —> |\| | |\| E
20) You have a cannon and two identical cannon balls.
You take the cannon to a large open location that
is perfectly flat and you adjust the cannon barrel
so that it is perfectly level. You load one of the
cannon balls into the cannon and you hold the
other cannon ball at the same height as the barrel.
You fire the cannon and drop the other cannon
ball at the same time. Which cannon ball will hit
the ground first?
Solution:
Both cannon balls should hit the ground at the
same time, since gravity acts equally on two ob-
jects having the same mass. The cannon barrel was
leveled and the cannon ball would begin to fall as
it moved forward out of the barrel at the same rate
as the cannon ball that was dropped by hand. They
would hit at the same time but the cannon ball
fired from the cannon would hit the ground far
away.
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Students and Their Learning from Reading
Chris Fenwick
Brunel University, UK
e-mail: chris.fenwick@bruneI.ac.uk
INTRODUCTION
My aim in this article is to summarize work I have
done over the last three years, focusing on the issue
of helping students learn from whatever mathemat-
ics text they read. Although these types of texts gen-
erally contain 3 modes of communication, namely
technical English, the language of mathematics itself
and diagrams, I will focus this article only on the tech-
nical English of such texts. The idea, then, that stu-
dents can develop techniques and strategies for learn-
ing from what they read is generally known as “read-
ing to learn.”
AN OVERVIEW
Now, mathematics courses cover a variety of subjects
from statistics and O.R. to pure mathematics to ap-
plied mathematics. I mention this only to point to the
fact that the textbooks students use to read, and hope-
fully learn from, are written in such different styles
and contain such depth of detail that they have great
problems developing an understanding of what they
read. Statistics texts tend to be written in a more pro-
saic and descriptive style than that of applied or pure
mathematics texts which usually tend to be very
tightly structured in terms of language, containing a
high concentration of technical words.
Given this, and the fact that students spend more time
trying to learn from written material than having ac-
cess to a teacher who can support them in their learn-
ing, it might be beneficial for them to be able to learn
how to go about reading meanings into the texts they
read, and as a result learning from these. Conse-
quently, the realm of reading-to-learn part of my work
has focused on developing techniques which allow
students to develop an ability to read to learn from
text written in plain or technical style of language by
adopting an interpretive approach to their reading.
Supporting students’ learning from reading is done
via the use of text manipulation and gist elicitation
techniques aimed at allowing students to develop their
own personally significant meaning and understand-
ing of the text.
INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL
One thing that always troubled me, early on in my
teaching career, was the fact that whatever assign-
ments I used to give my students, I could never be
sure that they understood the work they presented
me in return. The fact that any particular student ob-
tained a grade A or B was no guarantee that s/he ac-
tually understood the work clearly enough to be able
to explain it to me in conversation.
Separately, I went through a personal experience re-
lating to the writing of a set of course notes on the
subject of Laplace transforms. It was in me having
trouble finding a suitable analogy of what a transform
was, and then resolving the issue by actually orga-
nizing my ideas, writing them down, reorganizing my
ideas and rewriting them down, that I realized that it
was in my attempt to interpret and reinterpret the
subject that I actually learnt about it and how to
present it.
By this experience it became clear to me why I wanted
to include an element of interpretation in any work
the students presented. In deciding to adopt an inter-
pretative approach to the assignments I would give
my students, I felt I would be able to see more clearly
the degree to which they would illustrate their un-
derstanding. Also, their attempts at having to ex-
plain themselves in detail would provide the oppor-
tunity for deeper learning of the subject.
Since then my ultimate aim has always been to get
students to interpret the text and mathematics of what
they read. Consequently, in respect to a text being read,
I mean interpretation to be:
a personally significant and valid re-description of
the original text, based on the ever more refined and
cultivated meaning you image of that text.
I shall therefore adopt this as the working description
of “interpretation.” An example of a text which a stu-
dent would have to interpret in order to understand
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and learn from could therefore be something like:
In elementary combinatorics it is shown that the
number of partitions P(n,m) of a natural number n
into m (not necessarily distinct) summands can be
calculated with the recursion formula...
(G. Walther 1986), or
Confidence intervals and hypothesis tests based on
large samples (n ≥ 30) , discussed previously, rely on
the fact that the statistic
x − µ
σ / n
has approximately a standard normal distribution
when n ≥ 30 . This follows from the Central Limit
Theorem discussed in section 7.7.
(Chase and Bown p. 358, 1997). What generally tends
to blind students about these types of definitions and
expressions is the technicality/density of the
language. To overcome this problem of non-
understanding based on the type of language,
students might then want to interpret these technical
definitions in plain English, and more specifically in
their own plain English, in order to develop a level of
understanding of the technical language.
It would then be in the act of attempting to interpret
the above definitions that students would be in a pro-
cess of constructing a meaning to them. Given that
their initial interpretations would probably be vague,
incoherent and incorrect in parts, they could then go
about refining these into more coherent, precise and
correct descriptions.
What should be borne in mind here is not that I am
advocating the simplification of the language of math-
ematics but that I am advocating its simplification as
a means to developing a learning of mathematics, with
continued interpretation as the process for that learn-
ing. Once the student has learnt to interpret and read
the text, s/he will naturally talk about the subject at
the more rarefied level of communication that more
experienced mathematicians take for granted. The ad-
vantage from the student’s perspective, however, is
that s/he will now do so from a much stronger and
personally more meaningful basis.
But, in order to do this, students need to learn how to
read in order to use their reading as a basis for their
learning. This implies that they need to use certain
techniques for reading. However, beyond the mere use
of techniques lies the domain of “strategy.” Students
need to be able to organize the way they use the tech-
niques when reading-to-learn, depending upon the
style of text they are reading (such an area lies be-
yond the scope of this article).
TECHNIQUES FOR INTERPRETING TEXT
The specific techniques which I have developed over
the past three years can be classified into two fami-
lies:
1) A family of techniques designed to help students
interpret the detailed, micro level of the text that I
call KE*
2) A family of techniques designed to help students
interpret the general, macro level of the text that I
call Text Levels.
MICRO LEVEL TECHNIQUES: KE*
This family of techniques arose out of an experience I
had with a student who had come to me for help with
one of her subjects. Based on a set of notes her lec-
turer had given her, I proceeded to read a part of it
and asked her if she understood a particular sentence
relating to the definition of the word “stress” as relat-
ing to engineering. The sentence was:
The distribution of force across a section is called
stress.
When she told me that she had not understood the
sentence, I told her that the sentence didn’t have to be
written the way it was. I then showed her other ways
the sentence could have been written; I did this by
swapping parts of the sentence around to get:
Stress is the distribution of force across the section.
Another attempt at finding alternate ways of restruc-
turing the sentence led me to:
Force across the section is called stress if it is dis-
tributed.
It is this last variation which led me to have an
epiphany. Whereas previously I believed that I had
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completely understood the original definition, it was
only with this last interpretation that I realized that I
hadn’t (well, not completely). It was in putting the
word “distributed” at the end of the sentence that I
finally understood the need for the force to be distrib-
uted. This is a point I had not been consciously aware
of the necessity of. It then seemed that, in placing this
word at the end, a greater emphasis was placed on it
and allowed me to give a greater meaning to the term
“stress.”
I then came to name this technique of interpretation
Key Element Permutation (KEP), whereby a person may
choose any element of text as the key part to work
with, and then permute them in any order. From this
s/he would have to develop a grammatical and mean-
ingful sentence around the
new order of the elements.
After this I developed other
text manipulation tech-
niques which, when used in
combination with KEP,
would provide students
with ways of interpreting
what they read. The two other main techniques were
Key Element Substitution (KES)
Here students swap chosen elements of text for either
synonyms or elaborated explanations that they believe
are most relevant. Such an approach to reading allows
then to recast text in a personally more appropriate
language, one which they understand fully. Such a
language can then act as a point of departure in terms
of refining their interpretation towards the level of
language of the original text.
Key Element Deletion (KED)
Here students simply go about deleting parts of the
text they feel are not necessary (what is defined as
necessary or not tends to be discussed in conversa-
tion) to see if this helps focus in more clearly on the
main theme of the text.
My experience in supporting student reading-to-learn
suggests that KED is by far the simplest technique for
them to put into practice from which useful meaning
of text can be derived. KES is slightly more difficult
to use for the purpose of interpretation since they are
more unsure of what synonyms to use or how to elabo-
rated upon the text. Indeed, their substitutions tend
to be quite vague and imprecise (which is to be ex-
pected for text they do not fully understand).
KEP is by far the most difficult since they are never
quite sure where to break the text up into elements or
how to construct a new sentence around the way they
have newly ordered the elements.
Now, you and I may recognize in these techniques
aspects of the way in which we already read. The point
is that many students do not have a systematic and
organized way of reading, and that is principally why
they cannot learn from their reading.
As an example, consider the G. Walther text presented
earlier. Deleting certain ele-
ments and using synonyms
for others one might de-
velop an initial interpreta-
tion to be:
In (...) combinatorics we
can see that the number of
splits P(n,m) of a (...) num-
ber (...) can be calculated with the (...) formula ...
where those elements deleted are represented by the
parentheses, and those element synonymized are rep-
resented in italics. Then, swapping parts of this sen-
tence around may help to generate an alternative em-
phasis on it and therefore inform a new understand-
ing to the student. Consequently, a student may de-
velop:
A formula can be used to calculate the number of
splits P(n,m) of a number.
As an initial interpretation this may be exactly the kind
of description that the student understands. S/he may
then develop a sequence of ever more refined inter-
pretation leading towards the original text, but this
time starting from a position of understanding and
from a process of knowing how to interpret.
MACRO LEVEL TECHNIQUES: TEXT LEVELS (TLS)
This family of techniques, designed to help students
focus in on the general gist of what they read, came to
me during a class I was teaching on discrete math. I
went into the very first lesson of the semester intend-
❝...many students do not have a systematic and
organized way of reading, and that is principally
why they cannot learn from their reading.
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ing to guide students in their reading to learn using
KE*. I had therefore decided to start the lesson by talk-
ing generally about a passage of the text we were us-
ing when it gradually dawned on me that I was inter-
preting the passage and doing so in an ever more gen-
eralized manner. I then realized that I was giving a
one to two word descriptor to each of the particular
paragraphs we were reading, and that in doing so it
could be said that I was interpreting the gist of the
paragraph.
In subsequent lessons I realised that I was adopting
the same approach of “gist” interpreting the text, but
this time for groups of sentences and then for indi-
vidual sentences themselves. From this I thought of a
hierarchy of “gist” interpretations based on the level
of text, these being paragraph level, “groups of sen-
tences” level, sentence level, etc...
Hence the idea of Text Levels (TLs) came to mind. They
then have as their aim to allow students to elicit a
meaning to the passage they are reading by initially
guiding them into seeing whatever general idea(s) of
the text they can. This guidance is given by the ask-
ing of an appropriate type of question such as “What
is the text an illustration of?” or “What is the passage
an example of?” The questions can then be altered to
focus on whatever level of text the teacher may wish
to guide their learning in.
As an example of the use of TLs consider the para-
graph by Chase and Bown presented earlier. In order
to focus the student’s mind towards a particular level
of text we might ask him/her, “What is each phrase
of the sentence an illustration of?” from which a stu-
dent may then interpret the text at the phrase level as:
for the 1st sentence
1st phrase: “Confidence intervals and hypothesis tests”
phrase interpretation: statement of techniques
2nd phrase: “based on large samples (n ≥ 30)”
phrase interpretation: recap or summary
3rd phrase: (x − µ ) / (σ / n )
phrase interpretation: formula
4th phrase: “has approximately a standard normal dis-
                   tribution when n ≥ 30”
phrase interpretation: statement
for the 2nd sentence
1st phrase: “This follows from”
phrase interpretation: linking or justification comment
2nd phrase: “the Central Limit Theorem discussed in
                    section 7.7.”
phrase interpretation: naming of theorem
From this we can see that concentrating on the phrase
level of text should help focus the student into con-
structing a more specific meaning to the text.
Beyond merely interpreting the gist of a particular
level of text, there remains the fact that they need to
be able to interpret the chunk of text as a “whole.”
Having interpreted the gist of the paragraph phrase
by phrase, the aim now would be for them to be able
to synthesize these descriptions into a coherent sum-
mary. This is done simply by creating a sentence or
two out of the separate text level descriptions in or-
der to develop a Text Level Construction. For example:
“This paragraph talks about some techniques and then
makes a summary. It then shows a formula and makes
a statement, and finishes with a statement and names
a theorem.”
With this interpretation in mind, the student may then
compare with the original text to personally judge the
viability of his/her understanding of the original text.
Now, the importance of constructing a sentence from
previously separate text level descriptions should not
be underestimated as a learning opportunity. By the
process of creating a TLC the student now has the
opportunity to develop the ability to express, clearly
and coherently, the meaning s/he has generated from
the text, and do so from his/her level of language. In
doing so it makes explicit the extent to which the stu-
dent has been able to construct a whole-meaning to
the text.
The whole purpose of these techniques is to allow stu-
dents the ability to develop a fairly detailed and pre-
cise meaning for the text they are reading. Conse-
quently, a student would aim to develop a final inter-
pretation such as:
“This paragraph talks about how two types of statis-
tical analyses, which use a particular formula, are
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based on a specific requirement. A particular theorem
is then stated as justifying the validity of this require-
ment.”
It would be a trivial step for the student to then iden-
tify the particular types of statistical analyses (i.e. con-
fidence intervals and hypothesis testing), the particu-
lar formula, the specific requirement (i.e. normality)
and the actual theorem used as justification.
HOW IT ALL WENT
All in all, having settled down in my own learning of
how to guide student learning, the vast majority of
students came away with a much improved ability at
learning mathematics (certainly all of them thought
that, at least, this was a useful experience to go through
even if they did not intend to carry on with this ap-
proach to learning the subject).
They were able to read into math a meaning they had
not previously seen or even thought they would be
able to see. As a consequence of this, their personal
attitudes towards the subject of mathematics itself
were considerably changed for the better. So, not only
has their level of math improved, but they can now
see how they themselves might go about improving
their level of understanding beyond that they devel-
oped in the sessions we had.
Furthermore, some of the students actually went be-
yond merely using this approach in their sessions with
me in that they automatically went about looking,
thinking about and learning from what they were
reading in other modules of their courses, without me
ever having suggested that they do this.
An example of the usefulness the techniques have had
in supporting students’ attitudes towards the subject
and their learning of it can be seen in the excerpt of
conversation below, which I held with some of my
students at the end of the course. The three partici-
pants of the conversation below are myself (“C”) and
three students N, M and K.
C: How did [the module] compare to normal math
modules that you might have done in the past?
K: At first when I first started the module I was
thinking, “Well, is this math or English?” But then
I understood why you were doing it because I
was starting to understand the subject and pick
it up faster.
N: Yours [the lecturer’s] was a better method.
K: [...] your approach was so much different, so
much easier. I mean, I can read anything now,
that I might not have been able to before in math.
M: I thought it was excellent. Yeh. It just let you think
about math in a different light, a different way. I
found it making math so much easier. Yeh, I used
it elsewhere. Because in some of my lectures
you’ve got loads of information. [...] I even use
the techniques for some of my exams because I
just basically cross out some jargon. [...] So I
thought it was excellent.
C: [...] Nimisha, any comments?
N: Well, I thought it was pretty good the way you
taught us. I got to understand the subject more.
The technique was really good because I could
apply it, and I could understand the actual math.
Before I couldn’t do that.
C: [...] Right. So let me ask you again what aspects
did you think you liked best in terms of content,
the lessons themselves, the text reading stuff,
anything, etc...
N: The text reading. I thought that was really good,
and it involved the actual student. [...]
C: And has your view about your like or dislike
about math changed?
N: Yeh, I like math now. (Laughs.) I never used to
like it that much because I couldn’t understand
it. But now I can understand it; I enjoy doing it.
M: Well, I’ve always loved math, but math was never
my strong point. But with this technique I can
now use it and understand math a bit further.
So, I found it really, really, really useful. (Laughs.)
C: What kind of insight do you think this [approach
to the course] has given you into ways of read-
ing or ways of learning?
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N: Well, now when I look at something I feel that I
don’t have to understand it straight away, and I
have something there that I can use to help me
understand that paragraph in time. So it’s good.
C: [...] What experience do you feel you have gained
[and] what do you value about the experience?
N: I’ve learnt how to read text, and I’ve started to
understand math better than I did before.
C: Right, and what do you value about having that
experience?
N: Getting to know math better and actually work-
ing with it. Because I know I need math for ev-
eryday life, so I’m so glad that I’ve actually
gained that knowledge, that understanding of
knowing what each bit is, and getting to know
my math better.
From these comments it therefore seems that, when
used as a classroom activity to support learning, stu-
dents are able to approach their reading in a way they
were not able to before, and consequently understand
and learn mathematics beyond what they had thought
possible.
WHAT OTHERS ARE DOING
A plethora of reading techniques abound in the read-
ing research literature (see for example Reading Re-
search Quarterly or the Journal of Reading), most of
which are based on developing students’ abilities at
comprehending the gist level of text. Schwartz (1980)
tested the different demands required of readers to
comprehend text at three different levels, namely
whole text level, individual word level and letter level.
Previous work (Meyer, Brandt, Bluth (1980), Rinehart
et al. (1986), Richgels et al. (1987)) suggests that good
readers, those able to identify and follow a text’s ma-
jor themes and relationships as well as the facts sup-
porting these themes, use a structure strategy when
reading, but that poor readers lack precisely this skill.
Consequently, Meyer, Brandt, Bluth (1980) developed
a structure strategy which was designed to follow the
organization of the author’s text structure and allow
students to focus on finding connections between
large chunks of the text they were reading, while
Rinehart et al. (1986) studied students’ abilities at sum-
marizing what they read by getting them to identify
and delete certain types of information, as well as re-
lating the main ideas they found to relevant support-
ing facts.
Little has been done in terms of helping students read-
to-learn at the micro level of text. However, some work
in the area of manipulation-type techniques includes
that of Straw and Schreiner (1982) who developed
sentence-combining and sentence-reduction tech-
niques for helping students better understand the text
they were reading. Ross (1972) has concentrated on
sentence manipulation and transformation techniques
(although not in connection with reading comprehen-
sion) while Rinehart et al. (1986) and Brown, Campione
and Day (1981) studied students’ abilities at under-
standing texts by using, in part, the deletion of cer-
tain types of information in order to summarize the
major and minor aspects of what they read. Bean and
Steenwyk (1984) have also used elements of deletion,
as well as substitution (based on the work of McNeil
and Donnant (1982)), in order to improve students’
summaries of the texts they were reading.
Weiss (1983) argues that the reason poor reading
comprehenders are not poor listening comprehenders
is that oral discourse is marked by (amongst other
aspects) pauses which are not marked in written dis-
course. His rationale was therefore that students could
develop into better comprehenders if such pauses
were introduced into the text, this being done by seg-
menting its sentences. Weiss then tested two types of
segmentation based on spacing out the phrases of a
sentence according to either their grammatical/syn-
tactic structure (of noun/verb phrases, or compound
phrases which framed a particular idea) or their pausal
structure (this being defined as a unit of utterance
between two pauses of breath which would occur
during the speaking of a particular sentence).
Other text manipulation techniques developed to
improve reading comprehension include those of
Weaver (1979) (RRQ 15(l)) who developed a way to
solve sentence anagrams by using a word grouping
strategy. Her aim was to improve reading comprehen-
sion by teaching students how to go about organiz-
ing their construction of sentences. Consequently, the
sentence anagram technique required students to form
a sentence out of a jumbled set of between five and
fifteen words, each word having been written on sepa-
rate cards. Students were then taught to construct their
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sentences by attending to the general structure of lan-
guage. Consequently, they grouped words into
phrases and grouped phrases into sentences, thus pro-
viding a structural approach to the construction of
their sentences (the students were taught to construct
the phrases themselves by using a verb as the focus
and “enframing” it by action words).
In fact, very little work has actually been done in read-
ing-to-learn in mathematics. The two principal people
involved in this area are Raffaella Borasi and Marjorie
Seigel (Borasi et al. (1998), Seigel and Borasi (1992),
Borasi and Seigel (1990), Seigel and Fonzi (1995)). The
majority of these studies focus on the reading of nar-
rative style texts and are based on an approach to read-
ing known as transactional theory of reading which
involves the reader in actively participating with the
text s/he is reading. Consequently, the reader is sup-
ported in a new way of thinking and engaging with a
text by certain techniques which aim to foster a gen-
erative approach to interpreting and learning from it.
Four approaches these workers have developed in-
clude Say Something (a type of free association tech-
nique), Cloning an Author (which involves develop-
ing a map of the interrelationships between what the
reader considers to be the important ideas of the text),
Sketch-to-Stretch (in which the reader sketches an in-
terpretation to the text) and Enactment (in which the
reader aims to act out the story of the text).
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The Third International Anthology on Paradoxism is avail-
able from Bell & Howell, 300 N. Zeeb Road, P. 0. Box
136, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 or
http://www.umi.com/bod/
Recently I received a copy of this fascinating journal
of paradoxist, tautologic and dualistic distichs by
writers from fifteen nations, including the United
States. You may be unfamiliar with the “distich” but,
before I give its definition, it is pertinent to describe
the movement out of which this term emerged.
A new movement in literature called paradoxism—
which makes heavy use of opposites (antitheses, con-
tradictions, oxymorons and paradoxes) at both local
and global levels in creative work—began in the 1980s
in Romania. Its initial driving force was an anti-to-
talitarian protest against a closed society where the
entire culture was manipulated by a small group. An-
thology editor, Florentin Smarandache, who now lives
and teaches in New Mexico, responded to the crisis
with the idea, “Let’s do literature...without doing lit-
erature!” In short, by keeping silent and, for example,
observing that a bird in flight is itself a poem (a “natu-
ral” poem, needing no words).
This beginning then led to an emphasis on contradic-
tions. Most in Romania lived a double life—an offi-
cial one conforming to the political system and an-
other “real” life. People said “life is wonderful” when,
in reality, “life is miserable.” Language opposites were
flourishing! Thus paradoxism was born. Folk jokes,
which said one thing and meant the opposite, were
very prevalent during Ceausescu’s era.
Paradoxism has introduced a number of literary terms;
here are several of them:
Paradoxist distich: a two-line poem in which the sec-
ond line contradicts the first, but both lines together
form a sensible explanation of the title.
Example (by Smarandache):
SCAPEGOAT
Even if he didn’t
he did
Tautological distich: a two-line poem that appears to be
redundant, but the pair of lines deepens the explana-
tion of the title.
Example (Smarandache):
IMITATOR
Discovered
What others have already discovered
Dualist distich: a two-line poem in which the second
line is the dual of the first, and together they explain
the title.
Example (Smarandache):
MULTIDISCIPLINARY
History or art
Or the art of history
The Third International Anthology on Paradoxism en-
tertains and puzzles its readers with nearly one hun-
dred pages of distiches and variants, all offered in
English but some also provided in Chinese, Italian,
Romanian and Spanish.
Here are several samples:
from Paul Haugh (Australia):
CUTTING REMARKS
Sharp as a knife
Blunt as a cork
from Paulo Bauler (Brazil):
ORDER
Someone with all the reasons is
Somebody with no reason
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from Maria do Carmo Gaspar De Oliveira (Brazil):
DISCOVERERS
Portuguese discovered Brazil
Already discovered by Indians
from Victor Chnagnone (China):
ENEMY
Fails
When we succeed
from Richard Cheevers (England):
URBAN JUNGLE
On a London street
Zebra crossing
from Anand Rose (India):
WISE
When you know
you don’t know the answer
from John Grey (USA):
MAD WORLD
you’d be crazy
to be sane
It was so true the cone did age
Ten-fifteen billion
It is so true the earthly age
Four and a half billion.
It is yet true my only age
The forties
My end, it will surely come
The eighties-nineties.
Nature, her organic-inorganic wonderings
In the wings, on cue
Appear, disappear
On a temporary reflector revolving.
See trembling aspen leaves, a grouse
Alluring nest on the ground hatches
In twenty-one days the fledglings drowse
From on high the goshawk watches.
See this year the drumming grouse
Their numbers few, heard scarcely
The goshawk lays eggs only two
Instead of four when prey a plenty.
See cold Arctic the hunting lynx
Pursues the snowshow hare, a meal
See as sunlight the flowerings control
So hare fleets the lynx withhold.
The numbers when genius Jason dawned
Bursting forth at nine and two
See poor Jimmy come faster born
Came four weeks with raw limbs too.
Earth a scientific developer
Counts hours, days, seconds too
Releasing light darkness covers
In revolutions and leap years new.
Can we figures, give up forget?
Can we cycles, senses insensate?
Do we deny light-matter nets
Food webs, equilibria, numbers-kind?
Thus the dispersing universal cone
A developing matrix electromagnetic
Her offspring, her coordinates dynamic
Show moving graphs, patterns, bones.
Thus do light packets, photons
Imprisoned energy, nucleons
In seconds, minutes exposed
Produce on matter-film sequential codons
Alluring pictures, images
The living kind!
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